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FRIENDING THE PRIVACY REGULATORS
William McGeveran*

According to conventional wisdom, data privacy regulators in the European Union
are unreasonably demanding, while their American counterparts are laughably lax.
Many observers further assume that any privacy enforcement without monetary
fines or other punishment is an ineffective “slap on the wrist.” This Article
demonstrates that both of these assumptions are wrong. It uses the simultaneous
2011 investigations of Facebook’s privacy practices by regulators in the United
States and Ireland as a case study. These two agencies reached broadly similar
conclusions, and neither imposed a traditional penalty. Instead, they utilized
“responsive regulation,” where the government emphasizes less adversarial
techniques and considers formal enforcement actions more of a last resort.
When regulators in different jurisdictions employ this same responsive regulatory
strategy, they blur the supposedly sharp distinctions between them, despite what
may be written in their respective constitutional proclamations or statute books.
Moreover, “regulatory friending” techniques work effectively in the privacy
context. Responsive regulation encourages companies to improve their practices
continually, it retains flexibility to deal with changing technology, and it discharges
oversight duties cost-effectively, thus improving real-world data practices.
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INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2011, two different government privacy regulators completed
comprehensive investigations of the social networking platform Facebook. Both
reached broadly similar conclusions about the data-handling practices they
examined. Rather than imposing a conventional penalty, both regulators reached
agreements with the company compelling numerous improvements in the treatment
of personal data. This Article uses the Facebook investigations as a case study of
global privacy enforcement today.
The approach taken by both of these regulators was a textbook illustration
of a form of new governance theory known as “responsive regulation,” which has a
long pedigree in administrative law scholarship. Using this model, the government
emphasizes less adversarial techniques and only turns to formal and punitive
enforcement actions as a last resort if these fail. The Facebook case study illustrates
how these techniques have been adapted to privacy law. In effect, Facebook and the
privacy regulators “friended” one another.
This Article argues that we should understand most privacy regulation
through the prism of responsive regulation. Doing so illuminates two important
features of enforcement practices.
First, the two Facebook investigations reached similar outcomes even
though they occurred in two different countries with considerably divergent bodies
of substantive law. In the United States, Facebook came under the scrutiny of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”), which is a consumer
protection agency, not primarily a privacy regulator. The other investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (“ODPC”) in the
Republic of Ireland. Unlike the consumer protection law underlying the FTC’s
authority, the ODPC enforces a data protection regime. The consumer protection
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approach dominant in the United States and the data protection approach used
throughout the European Union (“E.U.”) differ greatly in substance and emphasis.1
But the use of responsive regulation on both sides of the Atlantic blurs the
supposedly sharp distinctions between jurisdictions, whatever may be written in
their respective constitutional proclamations or statute books.
Second, responsive regulation works pretty well. Some observers,
particularly in continental Europe, have criticized privacy enforcement in Ireland as
too permissive.2 Austrian privacy advocate Max Schrems once dubbed Ireland “the
Cayman Islands of the data barons.”3 U.S. regulators are often subject to similar
disparagement when they close enforcement actions without imposing traditional
punishments. 4 But the well-established literature on new governance methods,
including responsive regulation, demonstrates that tough and punitive enforcement
is not the true indicator of effective law.5 Where prior literature typically focused on
more industrial-era issues such as pollution control and product safety, 6 this Article
confirms that the model fares well in the digital economy too. “Regulatory
friending” is especially well suited to the privacy context. It gives companies more
1.
See infra Part I.
2.
See Ian Burrell, Billy Hawkes: The Irishman with a Billion People’s Privacy
to Protect, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgetsand-tech/news/billy-hawkes-the-irishman-with-a-billion-people-s-privacy-to-protect9115818.html.
Joe McNamee of European Digital Rights (EDRi), a civil rights group,
says the Irish commissioner’s office has ‘little credibility.’ Privacy
advocates accuse it of practising light-touch regulation. The Irish DPC
allows companies to ‘do whatever they want with personal data,’ plays
down the threat of sanctions, and rarely uses enforcement powers, says
EDRi.
Leo Mirani, How a Bureaucrat in a Struggling Country at the Edge of Europe Found Himself
Safeguarding the World’s Data, QUARTZ (Jan. 7, 2014), http://qz.com/162791/how-abureaucrat-in-a-struggling-country-at-the-edge-of-europe-found-himself-safeguarding-theworlds-data/.
3.
Derek Scally, Opinion, High Court Privacy Case Puts Ireland at Centre of
Data Collection Controversy, IRISH TIMES (June 14, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/high-court-privacy-case-puts-ireland-atcentre-of-data-collection-controversy-1.1831895.
4.
For example, one technology blogger reacted angrily to a settlement the FTC
reached with the makers of the popular social messaging app Snapchat, protesting that “[t]he
Federal Trade Commission today effectively told technology companies: Go ahead and lie to
consumers about your privacy protections, because even if you get caught, the most you’ll
have to do is apologize. (If that.)” Selena Larson, FTC To Silicon Valley: Lying About User
Privacy Will Get You a Big . . . Wrist Slap, READWRITE (May 8, 2014),
http://readwrite.com/2014/05/08/snapchat-ftc-wrist-slap-user-privacy.
5.
See infra Part II (discussing influential new governance scholarship that
deemphasizes the primacy of punitive measures).
6.
See, e.g., REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds.,
2000) (discussing the distinction between adversarial regulation and more cooperative forms
of new governance, and collecting articles analyzing how these techniques are applied in
different countries to regulate the environment, employment, and product safety).
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clarity about their compliance obligations and minimizes their risk of being
surprised by an adversarial regulatory action in a fast-changing environment.
Meanwhile, regulators can improve real-world data practices efficiently, flexibly,
and cooperatively. Since the 2011 investigations, Facebook has greatly improved its
treatment of personal data, and in certain ways its policies are now exemplary.7
An assessment of responsive privacy regulation across the United States
and the E.U. is very timely at this moment for several reasons.
To begin with, in recent years, the ODPC has become one of the world’s
most important privacy regulators. Facebook, Inc. manages its relationship with all
users outside the United States and Canada through Facebook Ireland Ltd., its
Dublin-based subsidiary.8 For reasons mostly unrelated to privacy, 9 numerous other
global technology companies have also established substantial second homes in
Ireland, including Google, Apple, Intel, Twitter, and eBay. 10 That puts the ODPC at
the center of the most cutting-edge digital privacy issues. Yet, there has been little
sustained scholarly scrutiny of Irish privacy law or the ODPC.
Meanwhile, E.U. data protection law, and therefore Irish law along with it,
is changing rapidly. In late 2015, an E.U. court case invalidated the U.S.–E.U. Safe
Harbor Agreement, a legal mechanism used by over 4,500 U.S. companies to
transfer personal data from the E.U. to the United States—potentially subjecting
many more of them to E.U. enforcement.11 A replacement mechanism, known as the
“Privacy Shield,” went into effect in mid-2016, but remains untested. 12 Also in

7.
See infra notes 338–42 and accompanying text (discussing Facebook’s privacy
improvements since 2011).
8.
See infra notes 317–19 and accompanying text (discussing Facebook’s
significant presence in Ireland).
9.
See infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text (discussing reasons technology
companies like Facebook have located in Ireland).
10.
According to one industry group, “At the last count, 179 companies from the
[U.S.] West Coast were employing over 36,000 people in Ireland—among them PayPal,
Twitter, Apple, Intel, eBay, Qualcomm, Oracle, McAfee and Yahoo!.” Thomas Breathnach,
Silicon Docklands to Silicon Valley, MAKE IT IN IR. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://makeitinireland.com/silicon-docklands-to-silicon-valley.
11.
Not incidentally, the case centered on Ireland’s ODPC. See Case C-362/14,
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 614CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015);
Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/technology/european-union-us-datacollection.html.
12.
European Commission Press Release IP/16/2461, European Commission
Launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows (July 12,
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm; Natalia Drozdiak, EU
Privacy Regulators Give Green Light to Data-Transfer Pact With U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 26,
2016, 9:33 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-regulators-give-green-light-todata-transfer-pact-with-u-s-1469534432 (reporting qualified approval of Privacy Shield by
Article 29 Working Party, which is composed of national data protection authorities); Sean
Hargrave, Is Privacy Shield Already A Dead Man Walking?, MEDIAPOST (July 27, 2016,
10:24
AM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/281233/is-privacy-shield-
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2016, the E.U. officially adopted its new General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”), the most comprehensive overhaul of E.U. privacy rules in over two
decades.13 The revisions move European statutory law even further from the U.S.
approach and create enormous new potential fines—but leave most day-to-day
power in the hands of the same national regulators as before.14 Understanding the
significance of regulatory style will be crucial to assessing the impact of the new
GDPR, which will become effective in all E.U. countries, including Ireland, in 2018.
Finally, this Article is timely because U.S. privacy scholarship has recently
taken an administrative turn that more closely examines the actual enforcement of
privacy law.15 More academic authors have begun to emphasize data handling “on
the ground”16 and to challenge the oversimplified picture of a vast transatlantic gulf
already-a-dead-man-walking.html (expressing skepticism about long-term survival of
Privacy Shield).
13.
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 [hereinafter GDPR];
see European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data
Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm;
Data
Protection
ReformParliament Approves New Rules Fit For the Digital Era, EUR. PARLIAMENT: NEWS (Apr. 14,
2016,
12:11
PM),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20160407IPR21776/data-protection-reform-parliament-approves-new-rules-fit-forthe-digital-era; Mark Scott, Europe Approves Tough New Data Protection Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/technology/eu-data-privacy.html.
14.
For further discussion of the GDPR, see infra notes 52–53 and accompanying
text and notes 398–400 and accompanying text.
15.
See, e.g., ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
APPROACHES (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016) [hereinafter ENFORCING PRIVACY]
(collecting international scholarship on governance and privacy law); CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016) (examining FTC regulation
of consumer privacy); Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the NonAmericanization of European Regulator Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP.
L. 411 (2011) (comparing data privacy regulation in four countries); Danielle Keats Citron,
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733297 (analyzing privacy
enforcement by state attorneys general); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the
Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369 (2016) (arguing administrative regulation
has changed to become informal, financialized, and involving increased input from the private
sector); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, SelfRegulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 439 (2011) (comparing regulatory
models available for privacy enforcement); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the
FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955 (2016) (critiquing FTC’s enforcement
techniques in data security cases); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (arguing that privacy attorneys
and the FTC treat consent decrees like an emerging “common law of privacy”); David Thaw,
The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 287 (2014) (using empirical
methods to evaluate different regulatory techniques applied to private-sector cybersecurity
practices).
16.
See, e.g., KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015);
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between U.S. and E.U. law in practice. 17 While there was earlier privacy law
scholarship in this vein, most notably the classic work of Colin Bennett (alone and
with co-author Charles Raab),18 serious examination of regulatory enforcement has
increased considerably in the last three to five years. By systematically analyzing
responsive regulation as a framework to describe multiple countries’ enforcement,
this Article contributes to an emerging privacy literature that grapples with the
mechanisms that turn abstract rules into real-world practices.19
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the legal background that
shows how the “data protection” model in the E.U. (and specifically Ireland) differs
from the “consumer protection” model more common in U.S. privacy law. Part II
introduces the concept of responsive regulation from administrative law scholarship.
Part III then explores the application of the responsive regulation model to day-today enforcement of privacy law in the United States and Ireland. Part IV gets more
specific, examining the Facebook investigations as an example of responsive
regulation in action. Finally, in Part V, this Article concludes by identifying lessons
that can guide policy development and further study.
The significance of responsive regulation should not be overstated. The
considerable differences between E.U. and U.S. privacy law described in Part I
remain, despite the shared regulatory techniques discussed later in the Article.
Moreover, while the privacy regulators examined here have adopted responsive
techniques, others have chosen varying regulatory styles. 20 And responsive
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63
STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011).
17.
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013) (applying Anne-Marie
Slaughter’s theory of international “harmonization networks” to show how U.S. and E.U.
institutions have engaged each other in a collaborative process of informal lawmaking to bring
their distinct privacy regimes into closer alignment); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 586
(arguing that, because of FTC’s increased privacy enforcement, “such comparisons are
increasingly becoming outdated”). See generally Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy?
Examining the Case for Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data
Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227, 243–50 (2014) (suggesting that U.S. privacy law
might properly be deemed to offer the “adequate level of protection” for personal data
required for cross-border transfers under E.U. law).
18.
See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB,
THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY (2003); see also Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy
Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with
Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305 (2001). For a classic work
on the formulation of privacy legislation rather than its regulatory enforcement, see PRISCILLA
M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1995).
19.
A new examination by Graham Greenleaf engages in a somewhat comparable
analysis of responsive privacy regulation in Asia. Graham Greenleaf, Responsive Regulation
of Data Privacy: Theory and Asian Examples, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 233.
20.
See, e.g., Artemio Rallo Lombarte, The Spanish Experience of Enforcing
Privacy Norms: Two Decades of Evolution from Sticks to Carrots, in ENFORCING PRIVACY,
supra note 15, at 123, 131–141 (describing shift in Spanish data protection regulation from a
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regulation certainly is not some panacea for effective privacy enforcement. Rather,
regulators typically need to combine various strategies in different situations. All
enforcement is imperfect: the rules will always be violated by some.
Nonetheless, the fact that authorities in Ireland and the United States can
behave so similarly when enforcing such different laws belies the caricature of
radical difference. This Article offers a more refined portrait: on both sides of the
Atlantic, some regulators are moving toward pragmatic and flexible governance of
data practices for the digital age. In the end, responsive regulation might be the most
effective approach for protecting privacy while enjoying the benefits of
technological development. Thus, the equivalent results often reached in Ireland and
the United States are not problematic—they are desirable. Like any good friendship,
responsive regulation benefits both parties.

I. DATA PROTECTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Americans and Europeans view personal identity differently, 21 and
therefore, they understand individuals’ rights over the handling of their personal data
differently too. Attorneys in the United States and the E.U. do not even use the same
words to describe the law that governs the handling of personal information.
Americans include it under the broad rubric of “privacy law,” but E.U. and Irish
sources consistently refer to it as “data protection law,” a defined subset of a larger
notion of privacy.22 This difference extends far beyond nomenclature—it reflects
values. I have used this difference in terminology to provide students and
practitioners with helpful shorthand for two distinctive models of privacy rules. 23
Europe uses the “data protection” model. In the United States, a “consumer
protection” model dominates privacy law.
These distinctions have long and strong roots, extending back to
antecedents such as continental European social structures based on honor, dignity,
and rank on one side, and the New World’s individualistic spirit on the other. 24
Ireland can be seen as something of a hybrid: it is an island isolated from some
historical currents and a part of the Anglo-American legal and political culture, but
it shares Europe’s formal regulatory structure (by virtue of E.U. membership) as

highly punitive fine-oriented structure to one that includes warning letters for first offenses
and other more graduated responses).
21.
Indeed, they view many things differently. See generally The AmericanWestern
European
Values
Gap,
PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb.
29,
2012),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values-gap/.
22.
See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION 2–3 (2d ed. 2007). Bennett argues that the “data protection”
nomenclature is preferable because it is more precise. See BENNETT, supra note 18, at 12–14.
23.
See generally WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW
165–323 (2016).
24.
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
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well as much of the continent’s long feudal and clannish history. 25 The differing
rules in the United States and in Ireland reflect these distinct histories.
The “data protection” model characterizes law in all E.U. member states,
including Ireland. As discussed below, data protection law begins with an
assumption that control over personal information is a human right. 26 This generally
leads, in turn, to particular types of rules, including more specific terms and broader
prerogatives for individuals.27 On the other side of the ocean, generally applicable
American privacy law embraces a “consumer protection” approach. 28 U.S.
regulators, such as the FTC or state attorneys general, regulate privacy by policing
the fairness of particular transactions, much as they do when safeguarding
individuals against price gouging or false advertising. 29
All E.U. nations have adopted comprehensive data protection legislation
overseen by specialized data protection authorities (“DPAs”), while U.S. privacy
law is more piecemeal—many sectoral statutes that concern only certain subject
areas or particular technologies. Some of these narrower U.S. regulations are
properly described as data protection regimes, rather than consumer protection
regimes. These include regulations propagated by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)30 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (“COPPA”). 31 However, these are exceptions to the general pattern in the
United States; they were adopted only to protect especially sensitive data in defined
and highly regulated areas. There are a few sectoral laws in the E.U. as well,32 but
they all adhere to data protection principles.
This Part explains more fully the differences between the data protection
and consumer protection models. But first I want to highlight what is probably the
most significant of these differences: the default rule. A consumer protection regime
generally allows any collection and processing of personal data, unless it is
specifically forbidden. Data protection law adopts the opposite default, permitting
collection and processing only for a statutorily defined justification. In other words:
in the United States, it is usually allowed unless the law says that it is not, while in
the E.U. it is not allowed unless the law says that it is. 33
Because of this and other distinctions between data protection and
consumer protection law, an observer who simply examined this paper record—

25.
See generally RICHARD KILLEEN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRELAND (2012).
26.
See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
27.
MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 257–58.
28.
See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
29.
See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 165.
30.
Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.; 42
U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2016).
31.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2016).
32.
See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 105–06.
33.
See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 257.
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perhaps the proverbial visiting Martian34—might think the United States and the
E.U. were different planets when it comes to privacy law. Before the rest of the
Article turns to the analysis of convergence in enforcement, this initial Part reviews
the divergence in formal rules and underlying motivations. It will first consider data
protection rules found in Ireland and the E.U., and then the consumer protection
model that dominates U.S. privacy law. This discussion will also provide
background information that is important for understanding the discussion of
responsive regulation in the remainder of the Article.
A. The European Data Protection Model
European legal sources tend to view control over personal data as an
inherent aspect of individual dignity. This concept can be attributed in part to
continental political and cultural development of the idea that personal reputation
and honor are central to human flourishing. 35 Other distinctive European legal
doctrines, such as moral rights in intellectual property law, have similar origins. 36
Some analysts suggest that the memory of twentieth-century totalitarian
governments—which compiled personal data to facilitate atrocities such as the Nazi
Holocaust, the Stalinist purges, and political repression in Warsaw Pact countries—
may also explain reverence for data protection in Europe. 37 All of these historical
experiences probably contribute to the E.U.’s treatment of data protection rights
today.
Multiple European constitutional documents and treaties name privacy as
a fundamental human right, explicitly equivalent to other essential rights such as
freedom of expression or the entitlement to a fair trial. 38 This treatment is clearly
evident in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the closest thing to an E.U.

34.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[M]odern cell phones
. . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”).
35.
See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1164–89 (tracing the emergence of privacy
rights from continental European concepts of honor and dignity); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XII (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation.”).
36.
See generally Sonya G. Bonneau, Honor and Destruction: The Conflicted
Object in Moral Rights Law, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2013).
37.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial
Data on Governance Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529, 1618
(2013); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1349–50 (2000).
38.
See, e.g., Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Art.
8(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 35 (“No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”).
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constitutional bill of rights,39 as well as the European Convention on Human Rights,
of which Ireland is a signatory (as are all other E.U. nations).40 These documents
enshrine positive rights based on dignity and honor that are generally enforceable
against non-state actors. For example, individuals can invoke privacy rights
guaranteed by the European Convention or the E.U. Charter in support of lawsuits
against newspapers or magazines that allegedly invaded their privacy. 41
The Irish Constitution (like its U.S. counterpart) does not recognize an
explicit right to privacy or data protection in so many words, but Irish courts (like
U.S. ones) have inferred general privacy rights from other constitutional text and
structure. 42 Substantively, however, the resulting inferences from Ireland’s
constitutional order resemble the privacy rights enshrined more directly in other
European constitutions, rather than American constitutional privacy. As
summarized by a pair of Trinity College legal scholars, “[t]he Irish courts have
consistently described the right to privacy in a way which emphasises its connection
with dignitary values.”43 Regardless of the interpretation of the Republic of Ireland’s
constitution, the country is also subject to the provisions of the European Convention
and, when implementing E.U. law, the Charter. Thus, European and Irish

39.

Article 8 of the Charter reads:
Protection of personal data
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C326) 391, 397.
40.
European Convention on Human Rights supra note 38. Adherence to the
Convention is entirely separate from E.U. membership. Plenty of countries that do not belong
to the E.U. are signatories of the Convention; the United Kingdom’s planned withdrawal from
the E.U. would not itself change its status as a Convention signatory. Katie Grant, What Does
Brexit Mean For Our Human Rights?, INEWS (June 24, 2016, 5:37 PM),
https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/uk/brexit-means-human-rights/.
41.
See, e.g., Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Q.B.) 1777
(Eng.); Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294; Axel Springer AG v.
Germany
(No.
2),
EUR.
CT.
HUMAN
RTS.
(Oct.
10,
2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145700.
42.
See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mahon [2006] IEHC 86 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Kennedy v. Ireland
[1987] IR 587 (Ir.); Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36 (SC) (Ir.).
43.
HILARY DELANY & EOIN CAROLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 37 (2008) (“Irish
constitutional law rejected the traditional Anglo-American conception of privacy as a narrow
interest in isolation or inaccessibility in favour of a more sophisticated understanding of
privacy as a relational right.”). The authors’ discussion tracing the historical development of
Irish constitutional privacy jurisprudence can be found at id. at 33–56.
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constitutional law combine to establish control over personal data as a human right
of the highest order.
Statutory enactments in Europe and Ireland protect these rights with a
robust data protection regime. For the last several decades, the central statutory
instrument in the E.U. has been the Data Protection Directive of 1995 (“the
Directive”),44 which was promulgated just as the commercial development of the
internet was set to explode with the spread of web browsers. 45 The Directive sought
to harmonize data protection law throughout the E.U., consistent with the Union’s
broader goal of removing obstacles to free trade and movement between member
states.46 While it aimed for uniformity, the Directive also set a relatively stringent
baseline for substantive data protection around which countries would coalesce. 47
Article 1 of the Directive sets out these twin goals directly. 48
Like all E.U. directives, the Data Protection Directive compelled member
states to enact domestic legislation consistent with its terms. It left some margin for
different implementations on certain points, including many enforcement decisions,
but it also set minimum requirements for national law. 49 In 1988, before the
Directive, Ireland had already enacted a comprehensive Data Protection Act. 50 In
2003, the Irish Parliament amended the 1988 Act to reconcile a few remaining
inconsistencies between the statute and the Directive.51

44.
See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council on 24
Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ (L281) 31 [hereinafter E.U. Data Protection
Directive].
45.
The first web browser, Mosaic, was released in 1993. The year of the
Directive, 1995, was also when Microsoft introduced its groundbreaking Internet Explorer
browser, and the year both Amazon and eBay were founded. See Fifteen Years of the Web,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5243862.stm.
46.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union pmbl., Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
47.
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1973–74 (describing how Member States passed
omnibus legislation to satisfy the Directive’s requirements).
48.
As the Directive says:
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of
personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the
protection afforded under paragraph 1.
E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 1.
49.
See KUNER, supra note 22, at 34–35 (describing the supremacy of E.U. law
and implementation of directives).
50.
Data
Protection
Act,
(Act
No.
25/1988)
(Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1988/en/act/pub/0025/index.html [hereinafter Irish Data
Protection Act 1988].
51.
Data
Protection
Act
2003
(Act
No.6/2003)
(Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0006/index.html [hereinafter Irish Data

970

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 58:959

When it takes effect in 2018, the GDPR will automatically become the law
in Ireland and every other E.U. nation, supplanting the Directive and previous
national data protection laws.52 Because the GDPR is even stricter than the Directive
and the Irish Act in every important respect, the upcoming change does not affect
the analysis of responsive regulation in this Article, which only describes the formal
data protection regime in broad strokes. Indeed, the GDPR leaves national data
protection authorities in place as its primary enforcers even while making
substantive law more restrictive. As a result, the new rules might increase the
distance between the enactments written in the books by European functionaries and
the actions of regulators acting on the ground in individual member-state capitals.53
Ireland’s Data Protection Act is very faithful to the Directive, and the core
provisions described here are close to the GDPR as well. Its central definitions are
the broad categories of “personal data” and “processing.”54 According to the Act,
personal data is “data relating to a living individual who is or can be identified.”55
As guidance from the ODPC explains, “The definition is—deliberately — a very
broad one. In principle, it covers any information that relates to an identifiable,
living individual.” 56 This is exactly how the Directive defines personal data. 57
“Personally identifiable information” is a well-recognized category in privacy law;
similar definitions are found in several U.S. data protection statutes, including the
HIPAA regulations.58
Protection Act]. The Law Reform Commission has prepared an unofficial administrative
consolidation of the 1988 and 2003 Acts. Law Reform Commission, Data Protection Act
1988
Revised
(July
30
2016),
www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/RevisedActs/WithAnnotations/EN_ACT_1988_0025.PDF.
52.
See European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/6385, Questions and
Answers—Data Protection Reform (Dec. 21, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-15-6385_en.htm; European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321,
Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm.
53.
That said, the GDPR also includes mechanisms to increase uniformity of
regulatory choices in different member states. For more about the distribution of regulatory
authority under the GDPR, see infra notes 400–01 and accompanying text.
54.
Irish Data Protection Act supra note 51, § 1(a)(iv)–(v).
55.
Id.
56.
What is Personal Data? DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER,
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/What-is-Personal-Data-/210.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2016). See generally PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO IRISH AND EU
LAW 12–17 (2010).
57.
E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 2. (“‘[P]ersonal data’
shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity[.]”).
58.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (defining “individually identifiable health
information”). Some scholars have warned that the concept of “personally identifiable
information” should be substantially revised. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701,
1704 (2010) (warning that increased access to data and greater computing power can facilitate
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The Data Protection Act’s definition of processing is, if anything, even
more wide-ranging.59 Almost all modern digital activities fall under its umbrella,
including virtually any imaginable collection, use, manipulation, distribution, or
storage of personal data. 60 Manual methods such as keeping documents in a filing
cabinet are also covered, provided they hold personal data in a “relevant filing
system.”61 The Act also defines various actors connected to personal data: a data
subject is “an individual who is the subject of personal data”; a data controller
“controls the contents and use of personal data”; and a data processor—in practice,
often a data controller’s subcontractor—“processes personal data on behalf of a data
controller.”62 These roles span all industries and all types of personal information,
and they include private individuals as well as government, commercial, and
nonprofit organizations.63
With all these terms defined, the Data Protection Act next addresses the
substantive obligations of data controllers and processors. In line with the default
rule of a data protection model, the Act only allows processing of personal data on

the combination of disparate data points to identify seemingly anonymous users); Paul M.
Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011) (arguing that privacy law needs a
personally identifiable information component but it should be reworked). Nevertheless, it
remains a core concept in much of privacy and data protection law, including not only the
Directive but also the future GDPR. See European Commission Press Release
MEMO/15/6385, Questions and Answers—Data Protection Reform, supra note 52.
59.
The full definition reads:
“[P]rocessing” of or in relation to information or data, means performing
any operation or set of operations on the information or data, whether or
not by automatic means, including—
(a) obtaining, recording or keeping the information or data,
(b) collecting, organising, storing, altering or adapting the
information or data,
(c) retrieving, consulting or using the information or data,
(d) disclosing the information or data by transmitting, disseminating
or otherwise making it available, or
(e) aligning, combining, blocking, erasing or destroying the
information or data[.]
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(v).
60.
See CAREY, supra note 56, at 18–19 (“This definition of processing is very
wide and it is probably without limit. It could include anything that could be done with data.”).
61.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(i) (defining “manual data”);
CAREY, supra note 56, at 10–11 (describing examples of “manual data” subject to the Data
Protection Act).
62.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 1.
63.
CAREY, supra note 56, at 17 (expanding on scope of covered “persons” in
statute).
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the basis of “legitimate processing conditions”64 specifically listed in the statute.65
These include affirmative consent of the data subject,66 legitimate interests of the
data processor,67 and various public functions (most of which concern public sector
data processing). 68 Regulators and courts in both the E.U. and Ireland generally
construe these narrowly. 69 The Data Protection Act also defines a category of
“sensitive personal data,” 70 which is subject to an additional list of conditions
beyond those applicable to all other personal data.71
Data subjects enjoy rights of access to records about themselves, whether
held by public or private entities.72 They have a right to be informed whether a data
collector holds their personal information, and to inspect that data.73 In Ireland, data
subjects may demand copies of their personal data for a maximum charge of €6.35.74
The Directive also grants data subjects the right to request that an entity correct or
64.
PAUL LAMBERT, DATA PROTECTION LAW IN IRELAND: SOURCES AND ISSUES 69
(2013).
65.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2A).
66.
Id. § 4 (2A)(1)(a). This provision also allows for family members to give
consent on behalf of minors or incapacitated persons. Id. The GDPR continues the recognition
of the data subject’s consent as a legitimizing condition, but imposes a stricter standard for
how that consent can be secured. See GDPR, supra note 13, at art. 7.
67.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2A)(1)(d). The statute explicitly
subordinates interests of the data processor to those of the data subject, so this legitimizing
condition does not apply in cases where there is “prejudice to the fundamental rights and
freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.” Id.
68.
Id. §4( 2A)(1)(c). These are enumerated in broad terms including “the
administration of justice” and “function[s] of a public nature.” Id.
69.
See, e.g., Case C-212/13, Ryneš v. Úřad Pro Ochranu Osobních Údajů, 2014
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62013CJ0212 ¶¶ 29–30 (Dec. 11, 2014) (“Since the provisions of
Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe
fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in
the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter, the exception provided for in the
second indent of Article 3(2) of that directive must be narrowly construed.”) (citation
omitted); CAREY, supra note 56, at 39–46 (particularly ¶¶ 4-22, 4-34, 4-39, 4-44, and 4-47).
70.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(1) (including within the
definition of “sensitive personal data” the following: racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, sexual
life, commission or alleged commission of any offense, and any related criminal proceedings
including verdict or sentencing).
71.
Id. § 4(2B)(1)(b); see CAREY, supra note 56, at 58 (distilling these into 13
distinct conditions).
72.
For a summary, see LAMBERT, supra note 64, at 87–108.
73.
See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 98 (dividing access rights into four
categories, including right to know that data is held and to review it, as well as rights to
“correct or delete” and associated rights of redress).
74.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 5; see Data Protection (Fees)
Regulation
(S.I.
No.
347/1988)
(Ir.),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1988/si/347/made/en/print; Accessing Your Personal
Information,
DATA
PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER,
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Making-an-Access-Request/963.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2016).

2016]

PRIVACY REGULATORS

973

delete inaccurate or irrelevant personal information and to revoke previous consent
for data processing.75 In 2014, the E.U.’s highest court interpreted the Directive to
stipulate that these prerogatives, in combination, allow data subjects to demand the
removal of certain search engine links about themselves. 76 As of November 2016,
Google had fielded 4,485 such requests from people in Ireland.77
The comprehensive Irish Data Protection Act, as is typical in the E.U.,
extends to all types of organizations, be they public or private, for-profit or nonprofit. The single statute covers every industry and every type of data. 78 Special
additional requirements apply to sensitive data, but these are integrated into the same
underlying statute, not treated separately.79 The Irish law also covers most types of
data-handling activities; it uses expansive definitions of personal data, of the
individuals protected by the law, and of its territorial scope. 80 While E.U. data
protection regimes do contain exceptions, especially for governmental activities,
their scope is still much broader than that of any privacy law in the United States.81
B. The American Consumer Protection Model
U.S. privacy law is a smorgasbord. In contrast to European omnibus data
protection statutes, most American privacy legislation responds to narrowly defined
problems and applies solely to the type of data connected with that problem. 82 Some
statutes take aim at particular industries, such as providers of healthcare or cable
television.83 Others relate only to certain types of technology, such as the federal
Wiretap Act 84 or state laws specifically forbidding spyware 85 or “upskirt”

75.
E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 12.
76.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
77.
See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE:
TRANSPARENCY REP., https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (select Ireland from drop-down menu).
78.
LAMBERT, supra note 65, at 57 (“All organizations that collect and process
personal data must comply with the obligations of the Irish data protection regime.”); see E.U.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 3 (defining broad scope for E.U. data
protection law).
79.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2B).
80.
Id. § 1.
81.
See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 15–30
(2015).
82.
See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation:
Conflict and Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 238 (2015); Paul M. Schwartz,
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908–10 (2009).
83.
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.);
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
84.
Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
85.
See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 2016)
(preventing unauthorized users from collecting and using information on another’s computer
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photography.86 Some information, such as personal financial records, may fall under
multiple regimes simultaneously. 87 State tort law adds further mandates. 88
Government behavior is controlled largely by distinct constitutional limitations,
combined with a few specialized statutes that add requirements above those
constitutional minimums.89 Many of these rules are enforced by the judiciary rather
than any administrative enforcement authority.90
A few of these sectoral statutes in the United States resemble E.U. data
protection laws.91 They turn on the nature of the underlying personal information
and individuals’ interests in it, rather than on the transaction between data subjects
and organizations. Like their European counterparts, they typically permit only data
processing that falls within a legitimizing condition, and some also grant rights of
access.92
The scope of these American data protection laws is limited, however.
Health privacy rules promulgated under HIPAA cover a defined category of
individually identifiable “personal health information” and only bind “covered
entities” (mostly health insurers and medical providers) and their subcontractors. 93

in a variety of ways without consent); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/17-52.5 (West 2011)
(outlawing a variety of activities classified as “computer fraud”); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40301 to 13-40-303 (West 2016) (preventing unauthorized users from collecting and using
information on another’s computer in a variety of ways without consent).
86.
See, e.g., MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105 (West 2014) (banning
surreptitious nonconsensual photography of private areas of the body, in response to the use
of hidden cameras to photograph under women’s skirts in public places).
87.
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012); GrahamLeach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012); Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311–
5332 (2012).
88.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 28, §§ 652A–652E (AM. LAW INST.
1977). Common-law tort claims, while often pleaded, seldom address the issues connected
with large-scale modern data processing. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy
Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1826–28 (2010); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove,
Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1922–24 (2010).
89.
See Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2712, 3121–3127 (2012).
90.
That is true, naturally, of the common-law torts. It also describes almost all
enforcement against privacy violations by government actors, whether constitutional or
statutory. Because this Article concerns regulatory agencies’ enforcement models, tort claims
and restrictions against government activity fall outside its scope. But the existence of
additional privacy rules beyond administrative regulations further demonstrates the
fragmented nature of U.S. privacy law.
91.
See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 322–23 (listing and briefly describing
several U.S. sectoral data protection statutes).
92.
See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (listing permissible
purposes of consumer report information); § 1681g (mandating disclosure of certain
consumer records to consumers upon request).
93.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102 (2016); Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy,
Security, Enforcement and Breach Notification Rules; Other Modifications to the HIPAA
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5589 (Jan. 25, 2013).
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Protection for children’s privacy under COPPA94 applies only to operators of online
services like websites, and only when they have actual or constructive knowledge
that they gather information from children under the age of 13. 95 The Fair Credit
Reporting Act only regulates certain carefully defined dossiers of information that
are intended for specified purposes, such as underwriting loans or insurance and
screening employment applicants.96 These specialized statutes leave undisturbed the
U.S. default rule—data collection and processing is allowed unless a specific rule
forbids it—because most activities are not subject to these narrow restrictions.
Constitutional privacy rights in the United States are also circumscribed.
The U.S. Constitution is the oldest national written constitution in use today and is
among the most difficult to amend. 97 Consequently, it says little about the modern
concept of privacy and does not mention the word “privacy” at all. Generally,
constitutional recognition of privacy in the United States is consistent with a more
libertarian and less constitutive view of those rights. It is a highly American form of
privacy, intended to keep the government out of citizens’ lives. This familiar “right
to be let alone”98 was, according to Justice Brandeis, “the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”99
Yet protection for this most comprehensive of rights in the U.S.
Constitution100 is not nearly as comprehensive as data protection rights in European
constitutions. Privacy is generally subordinate to many other rights expressed more
clearly in the constitutional text, most notably the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech. 101 Furthermore, U.S. constitutional privacy protects individuals from

94.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016).
95.
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016).
96.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
97.
See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 260–61 (1996).
98.
For early uses of the phrase, see THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, OR, THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888); Samuel
D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
99.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
100.
A number of U.S. state constitutions enumerate a more specific privacy right
than does the federal constitution. Only one of them, California, confers anything like a data
protection right, or any right against private actors. See CAL. CONST., art. 1, §1; Hill v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). However, the test for suits under
this California constitutional provision is rigorous: “The party claiming a violation of the
constitutional right of privacy established in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution
must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.” International
Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21 v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 488,
499 (Cal. 2007).
101.
The boundaries between these two are highly contested in the scholarly
literature. Compare, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049 (2000) (arguing that most privacy laws present possible conflicts with the First
Amendment), with NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
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snooping or meddling by the government, but it does not constrain a person (or
private business) from collecting or using information about others, nor does it
confer human rights on individuals to control their personal data.102 It is, to borrow
from Isaiah Berlin, a negative liberty rather than a positive one. 103
Of course, modern courts have read various privacy protections into their
constitutional interpretations. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy not only
from law enforcement searches 104 but against unreasonable intrusions in public
schools105 and government workplaces106 as well. A line of cases under the doctrine
of substantive due process protects “decisional privacy” in intimately personal
matters.107 Even the First Amendment generates privacy rights necessary to exercise
the fundamental freedoms protected there.108
This constitutional jurisprudence does not confer any broad right to control
personal information equivalent to European human rights to data protection. U.S.
constitutional rights protect individuals from government interference—for
example, from unreasonable searches 109 or limits on autonomous personal
choices.110 The Supreme Court had explicit opportunities to identify a substantive
constitutional right to data protection three times, but each time it declined to do
so.111 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court accepted only that a duty to safeguard
citizen data in government databases “arguably has its roots in the Constitution,”112
and lower courts have been divided and inconsistent in their recognition of even the
narrowest version of this right.113

THE DIGITAL AGE 86–90 (2014)

(arguing that most privacy laws are consistent with the First
Amendment).
102.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96
(1989) (holding that constitutional rights limit state action, but do not compel the government
to restrain private actors from conduct). See generally Richard S. Kay, The State Action
Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10
CONST. COMMENT. 329 (1993) (summarizing and commenting upon scholarly and judicial
debate about the boundaries of the state action doctrine in the late twentieth century).
103.
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 118, 127 (1969).
104.
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
105.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985).
106.
See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 709 (1987).
107.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
108.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969); see also RICHARDS, supra note 101; Daniel J. Solove,
The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007).
109.
See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
110.
See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S at 485 (1965).
111.
See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2010); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
112.
429 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added).
113.
For a sense of the wide range, see, e.g., Cooksey v. Boyer, 289 F.3d 513, 516
(8th Cir. 2002) (suggesting disclosures “must be either a shocking degradation or an egregious
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So, sectoral statutes and torts cover narrowly defined behavior, and some
additional constitutional proscriptions apply to government activity. But most
private data-handling activities in the United States fall outside all these laws—
generally including data mining by companies like Amazon or Google, files kept by
local real estate brokers or bookstores, targeted advertising, most employee records,
location tracking, shopper loyalty programs, and many more examples. Importantly
for this Article, the massive data processing of Facebook (and other social media
platforms) generally falls outside these rules too. Are the potential privacy issues
raised by all these examples simply unregulated?
Well, no. In the absence of general-purpose omnibus privacy law like the
E.U. Directive, consumer protection regulators such as the FTC and state attorneys
general have moved in to fill the resulting vacuum. 114 This is the dominant consumer
protection approach to privacy law in the United States.
Consumer protection law is tied to the inequitable nature of the underlying
transaction, not to individual rights over personal data. The FTC imposes the most
widely applicable privacy obligations on commercial entities in the United States. It
does so by using its authority under Section 5 of its founding statute to police “unfair
and deceptive acts or practices” in interstate commerce. 115 Attorneys general in
individual states have also emerged as important enforcers of privacy law, using
power granted under state consumer protection statutes that resemble the FTC’s
Section 5 authority.116
Consumer protection regulators like the FTC thus play a cleanup role in the
system, regulating privacy where sectoral statutes do not. But even the FTC’s
Section 5 authority is limited not only by the substance of consumer protection, but
also by activity that is nongovernmental, interstate, and commercial—and portions
of specified industries are exempt from much FTC regulation, including some
financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, and airlines. 117

humiliation” to violate the constitutional right to privacy) (citing Alexander v. Peffer, 993
F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993)); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing “grave doubts as to the existence
of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information”); J.P. v.
DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088 (6th Cir. 1981) (criticizing “courts [that] have uncritically
picked up that part of Whalen pertaining to nondisclosure and have created a rule that the
courts must balance a governmental intrusion on this ‘right’ of privacy against the
government’s interest in the intrusion”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing the right and articulating a multifactor test to apply it).
114.
See Citron, supra note 15, at 3–4 (discussing the role of state attorneys
general); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 585–86 (discussing the role of the FTC).
115.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). For informative accounts of the FTC’s
enforcement of privacy law through application of Section 5, see generally HOOFNAGLE,
supra note 15; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15.
116.
See Citron, supra note 15, at 7–8.
117.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (listing exceptions from FTC authority); FTC
v. AT&T Mobility, No. 15-16585, 2016 WL 4501685, at *3–5 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016)
(interpreting “common carrier” exception from FTC authority extremely broadly in a case
outside of privacy law but applicable to all matters covered by Section 5, including privacy).
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Where it applies, the FTC’s Section 5 power is broad. As one court found
in upholding the FTC’s authority over privacy violations, unfair practices need not
be otherwise unlawful, provided they meet the test for unfairness in the statute. 118
That test finds a practice unfair if it “[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers [2] which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
[3] [is] not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.” 119 In addition, Section 5 prohibits deceptive practices related to
privacy—essentially any deviation in a company’s actions from the material
representations it has made about its data-handling practices. These “broken
promises” could be found not only in a formal privacy policy, but also in, for
example, marketing materials, help or support information such as FAQ’s, or even
the implications a reasonable person would draw from the interface on a website.120
The FTC has gradually developed working definitions of unfairness and
deception by using responsive regulation techniques.121 These evolving standards
contrast with the detailed rules marking the boundaries of data protection law in
Ireland. In its most basic form, the consumer protection model has long relied on
concepts of “notice and choice” or “privacy control,” requiring transparency about
data-handling practices and giving individuals the ability to “opt out” by declining
to proceed with a transaction. 122 This procedural focus—forcing disclosure and
relying on market forces to embody consumers’ privacy preferences—differs from
the substantive requirements of a data protection model. It does not provide
individuals with the broad rights of access or correction they have under the data
protection model.123 There is very little right to be forgotten under U.S. law either. 124

118.
See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding
that Section 5 “enables the FTC to take action against unfair practices that have not yet been
contemplated by more specific laws”).
119.
15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244
(3d Cir. 2015) (tracing history of unfairness test).
120.
See In re Snapchat, Inc., No. C-4501, 2014 WL 7495798, at *3–7 (Dec. 23,
2014) (charging a company with all these types of misrepresentations); see also Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 15, at 628–33 (describing evolution of FTC interpretation of deceptive
practices in the privacy context).
121.
See infra Section III.B.
122.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 779 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy
and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 816 (2000).
123.
A few extremely limited rights to examine personal data can be found in
isolated parts of federal and state privacy law in the United States but nothing approaches
Ireland’s general right of access to personal data held by the private sector. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g (2012) (providing consumers access to their own credit reports); 16 C.F.R. § 312.6
(2016) (providing right for parents to examine data collected from children under age 13
within scope of the statute); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2006) (providing right to be
informed about disclosures of personal data to third parties).
124.
In certain circumstances, California’s new “Eraser Law” allows juveniles to
withdraw information that they themselves have posted online. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 22581 (West 2015). U.S. regulation of credit reports also prohibits the inclusion of certain
personal data such as bankruptcies and tax liens after specified time periods. See 15 U.S.C.
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In addition, unlike European and Irish laws, which provide legal redress to
any affected individual—consistent with their understanding of data protection as a
core human right—many U.S. statutes reserve enforcement power for administrative
regulators alone. Only the FTC can enforce Section 5, 125 and individuals cannot
bring private lawsuits under numerous sectoral data protection laws. 126 Some
statutes do allow individual suits, 127 but even those opportunities are subject to
considerable practical limitations, such as the need to prove particularized injury
that confers standing to sue.128 If this hurdle is passed, damages for individual claims
may be small, which often means that class actions are the only viable mechanism
for private action. Regulatory agencies have procedures for individuals to file
complaints,129 but unlike the ODPC and other E.U. data protection authorities, there
is no obligation for U.S. agencies to act on these consumer grievances.
This Part’s summary of the difference between Irish data protection law
and U.S. consumer protection regulation “on the books” helps explain why
conventional wisdom assumes European regulation is always much more
demanding and protective of privacy than its American counterpart. The Article now
turns to the use of responsive regulation techniques “on the ground” to show how
enforcement choices can de-emphasize those distinctions and effectively promote
privacy under either legal model.

II. RESPONSIVE REGULATION
A generation of administrative law scholars has debated numerous forms
of “new governance”—many of them no longer all that new—that move beyond
traditional command-and-control policymaking and enforcement to improve the

§ 1681c(a) (2012). But these are very narrow rights compared to those provided by the Google
Spain case. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).
125.
See Sovern, supra note 18, at 1321–22, 1321 n.63.
126.
See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 274 (2002) (finding no private
right of action under statute protecting privacy of student records); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d
569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding there is no private cause of action under HIPAA).
127.
See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2012);
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2520 (2002). State consumer protection laws often
permit individual suits. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1204 (West 2016).
128.
See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (requiring
allegation of a privacy-related injury under FCRA to be both concrete and particularized in
order to confer standing); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013)
(finding allegations of electronic surveillance by intelligence agencies “too speculative to
satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”)
(internal quotation omitted); In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1012–15
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding lack of standing under California consumer protection statute).
129.
See How to File a Complaint with the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/video/how-filecomplaint-federal-trade-commission; Filing a HIPAA Complaint, U.S DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/filing-a-complaint/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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effectiveness and legitimacy of regulation. These scholars also have sought to
identify the ideal mixture of adversarial and cooperative approaches to maximize
compliance with the law. In their landmark 1992 book, Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite captured the debate: “The crucial question has become: When to punish;
when to persuade?” 130 While policymakers and legal scholars have increasingly
embraced a wide range of creative and flexible approaches to traditional regulatory
tasks in the intervening quarter century, 131 that question remains the crucial one
today.
A. Coregulation: Theory and Reality
In privacy law, scholars and legislators most often have gravitated toward
a particular flavor of new governance, sometimes called “coregulation,” where
agencies collaborate with industry groups or other third parties to develop detailed
substantive rules. 132 These rules may then become enforceable law, frequently
(though not always) subject to some approval or ratification by government
regulators.133 Coregulation and self-regulation can be partial or comprehensive and
can entail various levels of government participation. 134 Whatever its structure,
proponents of coregulation hope that active engagement with industry partners will
make the resulting requirements more feasible and more widely accepted by
regulated parties.
Several scholars have studied the possibility of privacy coregulation
closely. In a series of articles, Dennis Hirsch has drawn on experiences of
coregulation in environmental legislation135 and in the data protection law of the

130.
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 21 (1992).
131.
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004)
(comprehensively reviewing “a paradigm shift from a regulatory to a governance model,
signifying a collective intellectual and programmatic project for a new legal regime”).
132.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 106; Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (using
the term collaborative governance, instead of coregulation); Neil Gunningham & Joseph
Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997);
cf. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO COREGULATION (2010) (applying related new governance concepts to labor and employment
law).
133.
See Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond
Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 355, 383 (2011) (describing government
approval as necessary to ensure baseline regulatory objectives are met); see also BENNETT &
RAAB, supra note 18, at 123–33 (describing different industry-generated self-regulatory
instruments).
134.
See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 50–55 (1998).
135.
See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What
Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1 (2006); Hirsch,
supra note 15.
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Netherlands136 as possible models for data privacy rulemaking. Ira Rubinstein has
developed a normative framework that identifies “six elements that are critical to
the success of co-regulatory initiatives” in privacy law.137
Thus far, however, privacy coregulation in Ireland and in the United States
has existed much more often as an idea than as reality. In theory, Ireland’s Data
Protection Act envisions reliance on industry-created codes of practice.138 In reality,
there are few examples. There is a code concerning data breach notification, but the
ODPC treats it as a statement of best practices and not as a source of authoritative
legal obligations or defenses.139 Otherwise almost all codes of practice approved by
ODPC focus on public-sector entities. 140 The GDPR contains similar rules for
coregulation through codes of conduct and certification marks, but it is unclear
whether implementation of this approach will be any more common in Ireland than
it is today.141
There is even less demonstrated adoption of coregulation in U.S. privacy
law. In one instance, HIPAA mandated that data security regulations governing
healthcare providers and insurers must be developed with significant input from
industry players through a preexisting advisory board.142 David Thaw examined this
process and found several fairly unusual attributes that, he argues, made it a
coregulation success story. 143 Otherwise, coregulation has been a cornerstone of
proposed legislation in the United States, including the Obama Administration’s

136.
See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy
Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83 (2014).
137.
Rubinstein, supra note 133, at 380. The elements are: “efficiency, openness
and transparency, completeness, strategies to address free rider problems, oversight and
enforcement, and use of second-generation design features.” Id.
138.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 14(a)(2).
(instructing Commissioner to “encourage trade associations and other bodies representing
categories of data controllers to prepare codes of practice to be complied with by those
categories in dealing with personal data”).
139.
See CAREY, supra note 56, at 71.
140.
See id. at 161; DATA PROTECTION COMM’R, Annual Report of the Data
Protection
Commissioner
of
Ireland
2014,
at
11,
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/Annual%20Report%202014.pdf.
[hereinafter 2014 Annual Report]. For an example, see PERS. INJURY ASSESSMENT BD., Data
Protection
Code
of
Practice
(Jan.
9,
2008),
http://www.injuriesboard.ie/eng/resources/Data_Protection_Code_of_Practice/Data_Protect
ion_Code_of_Practice.pdf.
141.
GDPR, supra note 13, at arts. 40–43.
142.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1–d-2(2012).
143.
See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329,
353–62 (2014). Thaw identifies the historical roots of the advisory committee involved (an
elite body of top professionals that has existed since the 1950s), the collective good of
cybersecurity in a closed industry, and the ability of the federal Department of Health and
Human Services to write its own rules if these experts could not agree. Id. at 364–67. These
features would be difficult to recreate in a more contentious and open-ended issue area (like
most privacy issues) and without a preexisting elite advisory board.
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marquee privacy initiative144 and numerous bills sponsored by members of Congress
from both parties.145 None of these became law.
Coregulation may be a promising mechanism for the future development
of privacy law, but there are significant limitations that would make it difficult to
apply broadly in a system like that in the United States or Ireland. First, where it
exists, coregulation often depends on unique historical features. For example, as
Hirsch explained in his comprehensive study, Dutch privacy coregulation depends
on the longstanding and widespread tradition of cooperative regulation in the
Netherlands known as the “polder model,” named for areas of land below sea level
that were reclaimed through massive cooperative effort on the country’s famed dikes
and pumps.146 Second, most proposals for coregulation—including those introduced
in Washington, D.C.—contemplate an elaborate multilateral consultation process
seeking broad consensus about privacy law. 147 While stakeholder involvement
would confer more legitimacy on coregulation efforts, it would also make true
consensus much more difficult and expensive to accomplish. 148 For example, the
effort to develop a “do not track” protocol for websites 149 foundered because
industry representatives and privacy advocates could never reach consensus on
fundamental issues after years of acrimonious effort, and the initiative’s final
product was extremely limited.150
144.
See Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 17–20 (Discussion Draft),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015discussion-draft.pdf (proposing safe harbors from liability for data processing conducted in
compliance with industry-developed codes of conduct).
145.
See Best Practices Act, H.R. 611, 112th Cong. § 401 (2011); Consumer
Privacy Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 1528, 112th Cong. § 9 (2011); Commercial Privacy Bill
of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 501 (2011).
146.
See Hirsch, supra note 136, at 123–25. There is a vast academic and
journalistic literature on the polder model. See, e.g., LEI DELSEN, EXIT POLDER MODEL?:
SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS (2002); Yda Schreuder, The Polder Model
in Dutch Economic and Environmental Planning, 21 BULL. SCI. TECH. SOC. 237 (August
2001); Same Old Dutch: Is the Polder Model Back?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21565661-polder-model-back-same-old-dutch.
147.
For a powerful normative argument about the importance of such broad
participation, see Freeman, supra note 132, at 77–82; see also Rubinstein, supra note 133, at
421.
148.
See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 450 (2000).
149.
Tracking Protection Working Group, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/ (last visited July 8, 2014).
150.
See Dawn Chmielewski, How ‘Do Not Track’ Ended Up Going Nowhere,
RE/CODE (Jan. 4, 2016), http://recode.net/2016/01/04/how-do-not-track-ended-up-goingnowhere; Kate Kaye, Do Not Track Is Finally Coming, But Not as Originally Planned,
ADVERTISING AGE (July 17, 2015), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/trackfinally-coming-planned/299536/. I attended the first workshop to explore a do-not-track effort
in April 2011 at Princeton University, see W3C Workshop on Web Tracking and User
Privacy, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/2011/track-privacy/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2016), and decided at once that the effort was doomed—but I was sorry to be
proven correct. My interest in the concept of user agents communicating binding privacy
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B. The Responsive Regulation Model
All the focus on coregulation bypasses another approach that is already in
use: responsive regulation. While coregulation focuses primarily on the content of
rules, responsive regulation is concerned with the method of enforcing the rules,
regardless of their substance. And while coregulation presupposes many interested
parties achieving broad consensus, responsive regulation simply influences the
behavior of a regulator toward all regulated entities. Even when rules have been
written largely or entirely through traditional governmental processes, they can be
applied with an eye toward collaboration. Unlike coregulation, which rarely has
been implemented to govern privacy, responsive regulation of privacy already exists
in fact. Indeed, it dominates enforcement of privacy law in both Ireland and the
United States.
The model of responsive regulation strongly associated with Ayres and
Braithwaite is typically illustrated as a pyramid. 151 Tactics of dialogue and
persuasion lie at the broad base of the pyramid; agencies should use these first and
most frequently.152 Such informal methods often spur regulated entities to improve
their practices without any official action at all. The government can rely heavily on
this strategy of advice, exhortation, and industry cooperation, turning to penalties
only when these methods fail.153 At the next level up the pyramid, methods may be
more formal but still not directly punitive. A warning letter or a public rebuke might
get the attention of a company’s leadership. Even an announcement that a practice
will be investigated can have the desired effect of fixing the problem. The classic
pyramid then moves up through civil penalties to criminal ones. At the apex of the
pyramid are “nuclear” weapons such as the revocation of a company’s license to
operate.154
Responsive regulation works in a wide range of industries. 155 Generally
speaking, agencies use responsive regulation to relate to businesses under their
preferences goes all the way back to my first piece of published legal scholarship. See William
McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1812 (2001). In the interminable discussions surrounding proposals for both do-nottrack and P3P, stakeholders disagreed on fundamental binary decision points, and there was
no way to move past those disputes without a polder model, Hirsch, supra note 136, at 123–
24, or the types of institutional structures identified by Thaw, see supra note 143, at 371.
151.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 35–40; JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 30–34 (2002).
152.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 35.
153.
Id. at 35–48.
154.
Id.; see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 30–34 (summarizing the
pyramid approach); GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 396–97.
155.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for
Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 286–96 (2012) (identifying 11 “soft law”
mechanisms for governance of nanotechnology); Stuart Hogarth et. al., Closing the Gaps—
Enhancing the Regulation of Genetic Tests Using Responsive Regulation, 62 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 831, 839–47 (2007) (applying disclosure and guidance strategies to the regulation of
genetic testing); Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study
of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735,
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authority more as partners than as antagonists. At the base of the pyramid, they rely
upon such “soft law” techniques as education, guidance, dialogue, advice, and
transparency prior to using adversarial methods. 156 Responsive regulatory regimes
might resolve individual controversies through consultation and dispute resolution
with companies and the individuals affected by their practices. 157 While the
underlying possibility of fines or other legal sanctions surely influences the use of
all of these methods and their success, responsive regulation keeps them in the
background. If they eventually impose punishments, regulators do so primarily to
remedy shortcomings, not to seek retribution. As one well-known article explains,
“regulators begin by assuming virtue (to which they should respond by offering
cooperation), but when their expectations are disappointed, they respond with
progressively punitive and deterrent-oriented strategies until the regulatee
conforms.”158
Relying on the implied threat of punishment to get results without actually
imposing the penalty is a very old idea. Parents have probably relied on this method
since Eve gave birth to Cain and Abel. Sun Tzu described it as a military tactic.159
Perhaps its most famous invocation in modern times came from Theodore Roosevelt
in a speech at the Minnesota State Fair, where he advocated that U.S. diplomacy
should “speak softly but carry a big stick.”160 When he was an early chair of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s, the future Supreme Court Justice
William O. Douglas explicitly applied the same thinking to regulatory style, arguing
that government agencies like his ought to “keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind
the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never
have to be used.”161
Ayres and Braithwaite call this the “benign big gun” model of
enforcement. 162 Perhaps unlike Sun Tzu and Roosevelt’s geopolitical methods,
however, responsive regulation does not work well if the only penalties a regulator
can exact resemble all-out war. When the only possible punishments are so serious
that imposing them would be politically perilous, the threat to use them loses

770–79 (2009) (describing the well-established conciliation process for insurance disputes in
the United Kingdom).
156.
GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 60–69 (reviewing educational
and information-forcing regulatory instruments); see BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at
111–12 (discussing educational efforts undertaken by data protection regulators in multiple
jurisdictions); HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 100 (stating that “the FTC’s primary tactic in
privacy is an information-forcing one, namely the workshop”).
157.
See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 155, at 750–55.
158.
Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A PrincipleBased Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 864 (1999).
159.
SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 77 (Samuel Griffith trans., 1963) (“To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”).
160.
Ben Welter, Sept. 3, 1901: Roosevelt ‘Big Stick’ Speech at State Fair, STAR
TRIB. (Minn.) (Sept. 2, 2014, 6:08 PM), http://www.startribune.com/sept-3-1901-rooseveltbig-stick-speech-at-state-fair/273586721/.
161.
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940).
162.
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 38–41.
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credibility.163 Rather, regulators should have a wide range of options available, from
small consequences to very large ones, but keep them in the background. Regulators
can then use the specter of penalties for leverage when operating informally at the
base of the pyramid.164 At the middle levels of the pyramid, some of the agencies’
actions might impose consequences, but part of their power remains in the
possibility of more severe punishments. The largest penalties should be Douglas’s
metaphorical oiled shotguns, kept the furthest behind the door—but the mere
knowledge of their existence can influence compliance by regulated entities. 165
Responsive regulation is a general model, not a precise blueprint. The
specific nature of the actions at every level of the pyramid will differ depending on
factors like the nature of the regulated industry, the harm caused by infractions, and
the powers of the regulator. Moreover, no single regulatory formula is ideal for every
situation. 166 In fact, supporters of responsive regulation and other cooperative
enforcement strategies usually emphasize that most circumstances call for a wellconsidered mixture of strategies, including some more traditional ones.167 Bennett
and Raab recognized this over a decade ago when they summed up the varied
functions played by data protection authorities: “Commissioners act, variously, as
ombudsmen, auditors, consultants, educators, negotiators, policy advisers, and
enforcers. Not every role is played with equal weight by every commissioner. Nor
are these functions the exclusive responsibility of the data protection agency . . . .”168
Billy Hawkes, Ireland’s former Data Protection Commissioner, summarized his
tasks under Irish law in similar terms: an “enforcer role,” an “ombudsman role,” an
“educational role,” and a “transparency role.”169 As elaborated in the next Section
and in Parts III and IV, Ireland and the United States both use the regulatory pyramid
approach to combine these roles in their privacy enforcement.
C. Responsive Privacy Regulation
Several features of privacy compliance make it particularly well-suited to
responsive regulation. First, responsive regulation works most effectively when
regulated parties are otherwise motivated to do their best to comply with the law.
This makes the starting assumption of good faith more likely to be accurate.
Naturally, many companies seeking to monetize the value of customer data will view

163.
See id. at 45–46.
164.
Id. at 38.
165.
See id. at 47–48. As Greenleaf notes, however, these penalties must be serious
enough to command the attention of regulated entities. See Greenleaf, supra note 19, at 258.
See generally Hazel Grant & Hannah Crowther, How Effective Are Fines in Enforcing
Privacy?, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 287.
166.
See id. at 101; GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 388 (discussing
how a variety of approaches are best used together).
167.
See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 388–90 (concluding that
“regulatory pluralism” is necessary for optimal effectiveness).
168.
BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 109; see also id. at 109–114 (expanding
on the roles).
169.
Billy Hawkes, The Irish DPA and Its Approach to Data Protection, in
ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 441, 442–43.
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privacy regulation differently than the strongest privacy advocates. Nonetheless,
few companies see privacy as an area where they strive to get away with as much as
legally possible. Companies and their investors know that their privacy and security
practices influence brand value, customer trust, and ultimately, profitability. 170
Customer-facing companies of all types and sizes develop detailed voluntary
privacy policies and make them public.171
These efforts to observe privacy limits that extend beyond the legally
required minimum contrast with areas where the regulated entity strives to go as far
as possible without being penalized. Tax enforcement might be such an example:
most businesses would regard paying even a penny more tax than legally necessary
to be a blunder. 172 Privacy is not an area where the dominant ethos encourages
companies to push every boundary so long as they have a colorable legal argument
to defend their behavior. Regulators may still determine that policies or practices are
inadequate, but at a minimum, most businesses want to portray themselves, and to
perceive themselves, as safeguarding the privacy of their customers.
At a minimum, companies’ inclination to embrace best practices helps
make regulators’ collaborative efforts effective. But responsive regulation may
actually encourage those motivations. In their empirical study interviewing
corporate privacy officials in five countries, Bamberger and Mulligan found that
their interview subjects in the United States and Germany, the countries with the
more open-textured rules, understood privacy and data protection obligations in
terms of risk management and the formulation of company policies that match
consumer expectations, not as a function of compliance with settled law. 173
170.
See Colin Scott, Reflexive Governance, Meta-Regulation, and Corporate
Social Responsibility: The ‘Heineken Effect’, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 170, 177–82 (Nina Boeger et al. eds., 2008); Ronen Shamir, Capitalism,
Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 531, 540–44 (2010). For example, both Apple and the FBI concluded that the
company’s public stand in favor of customer privacy during their highly publicized dispute
over iPhone encryption enhanced Apple’s brand. See Klint Finley, Apple’s Noble Stand
Against the FBI Is Also Great Business, WIRED (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-noble-stand-against-the-fbi-is-also-great-business/;
Will Oremus, Irate DOJ Dismisses Apple’s Fight with the FBI as a ‘Brand Marketing
Strategy,’
SLATE
(Feb.
19,
2016),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/02/19/department_of_justice_motion_mocks
_apple_s_fbi_fight_as_a_brand_marketing.html.
171.
For the most part, companies post detailed privacy policies voluntarily. See
MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 166–67. California law requires most companies to post
privacy policies on their websites. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014). However,
that law does not mandate the contents or level of detail in these policies, nor does it require
them to cover data collected through mechanisms other than the website.
172.
Even in this realm, responsive regulation is on the rise. See Valerie Braithwaite
et al., Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y
137 passim (2007); Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to
Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 381, 385–86 (2009).
173.
BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16, at 59–104. Their findings are
consistent with my own interactions with U.S. corporate privacy officials.
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Corporate officials in Spain and France, where authorities have used responsive
techniques less readily, had an attitude more oriented toward technical
compliance.174 This contrast supports the notion that friendlier regulatory styles can
actually catalyze corporate social responsibility and the formation of privacyprotective norms, motivated not only by concern about the risk of legal penalties but
also by other economic and social incentives. 175
Second, rapid technological change increases the benefits of responsive
regulation. Scholars commonly point out the challenge of keeping the law current
with developing digital architecture, and with social and business adaptations to that
technology. It is expensive to keep command-and-control regulations up to date in
those circumstances.176 A costly game of regulatory whack-a-mole ensues, as the
rules adjust to new technology or practices, which then adjust to evade the rules.
Responsive regulation establishes continuing dialogue rather than fixed dictates.
That makes it a particularly strong response to situations where lawmakers have
difficulty staying abreast of rapid technological change. 177
By using responsive regulation based on broader principles, regulators can
secure compliance even as the details of technology change. At the same time, the
resulting flexibility enables continuous change and improvement of interfaces and
business methods—indeed, not just enables but encourages it. Rather than giving up
on the possibility of controlling the inexorable evolution of technology, responsive
regulation allows agencies to respond to those changes and ameliorate privacy
impacts without throttling productive innovation.178
There are, of course, dangers in responsive regulation as well. It can be
used to cloak inaction and laxity. Some scholars argue that responsive regulation
increases the likelihood of harmful agency capture or overestimates the rational and
moral behavior of corporations.179 Furthermore, it can be perceived by the public as
a charade, undermining confidence in the seriousness of enforcement of the law. In
addition, if a regulator concentrates too much on private resolution of individual
174.
Id. at 105–143.
175.
Id. at 219–37; cf. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 133–34 (discussing these
factors in the context of self-regulation).
176.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 26.
177.
Id.
178.
The Facebook case study considered in Part IV includes an example of
innovation that could have been throttled by unduly strong and potentially premature
command-and-control restrictions. See infra notes 290–93 and accompanying text (discussing
controversy surrounding Facebook’s introduction of its News Feed feature and subsequent
widespread acceptance of its benefits).
179.
See, e.g., Sara Singleton, Co‐ Operation or Capture? The Paradox of CoManagement and Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and
Environmental
Policy-Making,
9
ENVTL. POL.,
Summer
2000,
at
1,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644010008414522 (analyzing capture in locally devolved comanagement of natural resources); Steve Tombs, Understanding Regulation?, 11 SOC. &
LEGAL STUDS. 113, 126–28 (2002) (book review) (criticizing new governance scholars for
failing to account for power dynamics and for assuming too much moral and socially
responsible behavior by corporate entities).
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complaints and advice, it may fail “to make law general” in a way that shapes other
parties’ behavior effectively.180 Finally, agencies that rely on responsive regulation
without “broader political and cultural support for the regulator’s view of the law”
may find themselves forced either to revert to old-fashioned punitive enforcement
or to capitulate and relax enforcement entirely. 181
All that said, every approach to regulation includes risks. And there are
considerable advantages to responsive regulatory techniques. They generally are
more flexible and cost-effective than the alternatives.182 They also create incentives
for entities to promote internal compliance and best practices, especially if they
know that the regulator will look more kindly on alleged lapses where sincere efforts
have been made to embrace best practices.183 Most of all, in an area like privacy
regulation, where fixed rules are difficult to articulate, collaboration with
organizations holding personal data may be the only realistic way to protect
individual interests.
Part V will return to some lessons about improving responsive privacy
regulation to avoid its potential pitfalls. If used wisely, responsive regulation
techniques can ensure compliance with privacy laws effectively. Part III looks at the
overall implementation of responsive regulation in Ireland and the United States,
and Part IV then turns to the specific example of the Facebook case study.

III. RESPONSIVE PRIVACY REGULATION IN IRELAND AND THE U.S.
This Part looks at the regulatory strategy adopted by the ODPC in Section
A and by the main U.S. regulator, the FTC, in Section B. While doing so, it also
returns to the two questions that opened this Article. First, how does the similar
regulatory strategy in these two countries bridge gaps between the differing legal
requirements described in Part I? Second, how does the responsive regulatory
approach they have chosen actually work? This Part and the Facebook case study in
Part IV pursue answers to those questions.
We will see that the two countries’ convergent regulatory styles promote
comparable best practices in data handling on both sides of the Atlantic. Francesca
Bignami has traced a convergence of data protection enforcement in Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy toward “cooperative legalism” that uses “the threat of
inspections and sanctions to induce market[] actors to take privacy standards

180.
Susan S. Silbey, The Consequences of Responsive Regulation, in ENFORCING
REGULATION 147, 161–64 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984).
181.
Christine Parker, The ‘Compliance’ Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 611–13 (2006).
182.
See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 31–34.
183.
See, e.g., BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16, at 69–70 (discussing
reactions to the FTC’s enforcement strategies); cf. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 729–30
(2006) (applying a similar concept to local government compliance with the Voting Rights
Act).
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seriously.”184 Bamberger and Mulligan have found that regulatory behavior helped
explain similarities in corporate behavior related to privacy in the U.S. and
Germany.185 So it is with the United States and Ireland. Shortly before he left office
in 2014, Ireland’s former Data Protection Commissioner, Billy Hawkes, drew the
same conclusion in a speech:
As Ireland is a welcoming home for many US multinationals, we have
a particular interest in aiming for interoperability between EU and US
models of privacy protection. Privacy is a shared value, as is evident
from the broad agreement on privacy principles. . . .Recently
attending a conference in the US, I was struck by the fact that the
good practice advice from panels was not very different from what
you would hear at a European event.186

As for its effectiveness, the remedial actions required by the ODPC under
Irish law seem generally to satisfy the aggrieved citizens who lodge complaints.187
The FTC’s consent decrees typically impose 20-year privacy compliance programs
and continued FTC oversight on companies.188 Those facts provide a partial answer
to be taken up again in Part IV.
A. Ireland: The ODPC
Ireland is a very small country with a comparatively prosperous economy.
A population of just over 4.5 million makes it the smallest of the long-term (Cold
War era) E.U. members except for Luxembourg. 189 Traditionally, Ireland was also
considered among the “Poor Four” of those E.U. states along with Portugal, Spain,
and Greece.190 Then the economy, and especially the real estate market, overheated
184.
Bignami, supra note 15, at 460. Bennett noted indications of convergence in
the data protection law of Europe and the United States back in 1992. BENNETT, supra note
18, at 95–115.
185.
See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16, at 219–25.
186.
Billy Hawkes, Data Protection Comm’r, Address at the Institute of
International and European Affairs: Data Protection – the State, Technology and other
Challenges 5 (July 21, 2014).
187.
See infra notes 214–18 and accompanying text.
188.
See infra notes 249–57 and accompanying text.
189.
Ireland joined the European Community, the precursor to the E.U., in 1973
along with Denmark and the United Kingdom; these were the first nations to join since the
“Inner Six” founders began forming cooperative European bodies in the 1950s. A number of
smaller countries joined in 2004 and later during the significant enlargement of the E.U. after
the end of the Cold War. See European Union, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2009),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-andgovernment/international-organizations/european-union (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). Ireland
also has a smaller population than half the states in the United States: according to the U.S.
Census estimates for July 2015, Louisiana is ranked 25th among states with a population of
4.6 million; while the 26th state, Kentucky, has a population of 4.4 million people. Louisiana,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/22 (last visited
Sept. 19, 2016).
190.
See Alan Riding, Europe’s ‘Poor 4’ Demand More Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/05/world/europe-s-poor-4-demand-more-aid.html.
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during the “Celtic Tiger” boom of the 1990s and early 2000s, leading to a
devastating crash. Along with the other “Poor Four,” Ireland required an E.U.
bailout, but it was the first of the four to exit the bailout191 and is now emerging from
the worst of the financial crisis.192 In 2015, according to the World Bank, Ireland’s
per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) was an enviable $54,654, just
a tiny bit less than the per capita rate in the United States and higher than that of
every E.U. member state except Luxembourg. 193 Housing prices and long-term
unemployment remain serious problems, but Ireland has secured a place as a tiny
sibling among the first rank of global industrial powers.
Much of the previous boom and the current recovery derive from Ireland’s
remarkable success in attracting foreign investment of all kinds, particularly within
the technology sectors. Forbes Magazine routinely ranks Ireland near the top of its
annual list of the world’s most pro-business countries. 194 And some of the bestknown firms in the information industry—including not only Facebook, but also
Google, Intel, Apple, Twitter, LinkedIn, PayPal, and eBay—have established large
operations in Ireland. 195 These Irish outposts manage American companies’
activities in many countries: some cover all of Europe, some add the Middle East
and Africa, and others are responsible for data collected from the entire world
outside the United States (or, as in Facebook’s case, outside the United States and

191.
Henry McDonald, Ireland Becomes First Country to Exit Eurozone Bailout
Programme,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
13,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/13/ireland-first-country-exit-eurozonebailout.
192.
See Tara Cunningham, Is the Celtic Tiger Really Ready To Roar Again?,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12022109/Isthe-Celtic-Tiger-really-ready-to-roar-again.html.
193.
See GDP Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).
Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustments to GDP figures are a widely accepted method to
equalize currency calculations so that comparisons between countries are not distorted by
fluctuating currency exchange rates. See Frequently Asked Questions, Purchasing Power
Parities,
OECD
http://www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp/purchasingpowerparitiesfrequentlyaskedquestionsfaqs.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).
194.
Ireland ranked first in the world on the 2013 list. Kurt Badenhausen, Ireland
Heads Forbes’ List of the Best Countries for Business, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/12/04/ireland-heads-forbes-list-of-thebest-countries-for-business/. It was fourth in the most recent ranking, behind Denmark, New
Zealand, and Norway. Kurt Badenhausen, The Best Countries for Business 2015, FORBES
(Dec. 16, 2015), www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/12/16/the-best-countries-forbusiness-2015.
195.
See Breathnach, supra note 10; Burrell, supra note 2.
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Canada). 196 As of 2014, this rapidly growing information technology sector
accounted for 40% of Irish exports.197
There are many reasons why so many high-tech multinationals have set up
shop in Ireland, most notably Europe’s lowest corporate tax rate and controversial
rules concerning tax residency and transfer pricing that enable companies to further
reduce their tax liability.198 Other attractions for U.S. tech companies include a very
well-educated workforce, low labor costs due to stubborn unemployment rates, and
universal English. 199 There is reason to believe that regulatory policy further
contributes to the appeal. Facebook privacy executives have indicated that the
country’s regulatory environment was one of several reasons the company chose to
base such a large operation in Ireland. 200 Whatever their original motivation for
setting up second homes in Ireland, technology companies are now a substantial
presence in Ireland’s still-fragile economy, making cooperative data protection
enforcement a high priority for the government there.
Ireland’s original 1988 Data Protection Act established the position of Data
Protection Commissioner and empowered that official to enforce the Data Protection
Act across all industries, including the government and non-profit sectors as well as
businesses of every type.201 While there was little reason at the time to expect the
196.
Twitter, for example, implemented this shift in 2015, changing its terms of
service so that all non-U.S. users have a legal relationship with Twitter’s Irish subsidiary
rather than its U.S.-based parent company. See Mark Paul, Ireland to Become Privacy
Regulator
for
300m
Twitter
Users,
IRISH TIMES
(Apr.
17,
2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/ireland-to-become-privacy-regulator-for300m-twitter-users-1.2180137. Facebook has long used the same technique for all users
outside the United States and Canada. See DATA PROT. COMM’R, Report of Audit: Facebook
Ireland Ltd. 3 (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Facebook-Ireland-AuditReport-December-2011/1187.htm [hereinafter ODPC Facebook Audit].
197.
Burrell, supra note 2.
198.
James Kanter & Landon Thomas Jr., Tax Deals Are Target of Inquiry in
Europe,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
12,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/business/international/eu-to-investigate-countriesbusiness-tax-breaks.html. The IRS has disputed Facebook’s valuation of assets transferred to
Ireland and is now pursuing the company for an alleged tax deficiency of between 3 and 5
billion dollars, plus interest and penalties, in relation to its Irish operations. See Kartikay
Mehrotra, Facebook Tax Bill Over Ireland Move Could Cost $5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (July
28, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/facebook-gets-3-5-billionirs-tax-notice-over-ireland-move.
199.
Kurt Badenhausen, Ireland Heads Forbes’ List of the Best Countries for
Businesses,
FORBES
(Dec.
4,
2014,
9:58
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/12/04/ireland-heads-forbes-list-of-thebest-countries-for-business/#13d7ed541e6a. Also, it must be said: excellent beer and music,
friendly people, and beautiful scenery.
200.
Karin Lillington, Ireland’s Regulatory Reputation Encouraged Facebook HQ,
IRISH
TIMES
(Jul.
9,
2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/
ireland-s-regulatory-reputation-encouraged-facebook-hq-1.2279283 (“Facebook set up its
operations in Ireland in part because it felt the regulatory environment ‘was seen as a good
high standard’ internationally.”).
201.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 9.
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ODPC to play a pivotal role in regulating the data-handling practices of so many
high-tech multinationals from around the globe, the structure laid out in that 1988
statute remains in place. The underlying law will change when the GDPR becomes
effective in 2018, but primary regulatory authority will remain with the ODPC
(subject to some new pan-European procedures, discussed below). 202
The Act’s text directly promotes responsive regulation. One of its key
provisions allows individuals to file complaints with the ODPC alleging violations
of data protection law, although the ODPC is also free to pursue actions on its own
initiative. 203 The Act decrees that the ODPC “shall” investigate each complaint
received unless it is “frivolous or vexatious.”204 The ODPC is obliged to seek an
“amicable resolution” of such complaints first, and to move to more formal
processes if this is not possible “within a reasonable time.”205 Those dissatisfied with
the outcome may appeal to the Irish courts. 206 From there, cases may be referred to
the E.U. judicial system. Schrems, the Austrian privacy activist, took this
opportunity when displeased with the ODPC’s response to his complaint about
Facebook transferring data to the U.S. under the Safe Harbor Agreement; he
appealed to the Irish High Court, and his case went from there to the Court of Justice
of the European Union, the highest in the E.U.207 In addition to striking down Safe
Harbor, the Court of Justice held that national data protection authorities are obliged
to exercise their investigatory and enforcement powers in response to citizen
complaints.208
This architecture encourages the use of the responsible regulation pyramid.
The statutory text requires the use of consultation first, and allows a move toward
more punitive measures if (and only if) those fail. 209 Annual reports produced by the
ODPC demonstrate how these statutory instructions are applied in practice. The
reports, among other things, provide statistics about the complaints received that
year and summarize “case studies” of the actions taken and conclusions reached.210
The statistics indicate that intervention, negotiation, and settlement are a
great deal more common than adversarial processes at the ODPC. According to its
annual reports, the ODPC has received between 900 and 1,350 complaints per year
202.
See infra notes 403–06 and accompanying text.
203.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 10(1A); see Complaint Form,
DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER, https://www.dataprotection.ie/raise-a-concern/ (last
visited June 19, 2016).
204.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 10(b); see also CAREY, supra
note 56, at 157 (explaining complaint procedure).
205.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 10(a)(ii).
206.
Id.; see also infra Section V.A.3.
207.
See infra notes 389–91 and accompanying text.
208.
See Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62014CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015).
209.
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 10(b)(ii).
210.
For annual reports dating back to 1997, see Annual Reports, DATA
PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER
https://www.dataprotection.ie/ViewDoc.asp?fn=/documents/annualreports/ARHome.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2016). [hereinafter [Year] ODPC Annual Report].
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since 2007.211 In recent years, about half of all those complaints were related to
requests by individuals for access to personal data held by a processor.212 Of 829
complaints resolved in 2014, only 27 resulted in formal decisions by the
Commissioner.213 This very low percentage is typical of recent years. 214
The annual reports are also full of rather charming case studies involving
disputes over data handling that were resolved to the satisfaction of the aggrieved
party through some combination of measures such as an apology, the destruction or
correction of the person’s records, and reform of the offending practice. One
illustrative example from 2011, the same year as the ODPC Facebook investigation,
concerned a complaint by the user of a gym and swimming pool about the excessive
amount of information solicited on a required medical form. 215 The ODPC
communicated with the management at the “leisure centre” requesting further
information, and then determined that the information collected was
“disproportionate” to its purpose, thus violating the Data Protection Act. 216 The
facility agreed to make completion of the form optional in the future rather than
mandatory, and to destroy existing forms upon request; the complaining party
accepted this settlement. The case study concluded: “As a result of this complaint,
members of the public may now use the swimming pool at the leisure centre on an
anonymous basis and that is as it should be.”217 The 2014 annual report recounted a
similar story of a complaint against an apartment broker (called a “letting agency”—
the Irish just have better names for things) that collected excessive amounts of data
from those merely applying for a rental lease.218 There again, the agency agreed to
change its practices and the case study concluded: “The complainant informed us
that she was very satisfied with the outcome of her complaint.”219 These anecdotes
add detail to the statistical portrait of an agency primarily concerned with assisting
regulated entities in their efforts to comply with the law and helping citizens reach
amicable resolutions after violations of their broad data protection rights.
211.
See, e.g., 2015 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 5 (Commissioner
received 932 complaints in 2015, and 960 in 2014); 2013 ODPC Annual Report, supra note
210, at 9 (910 complaints in 2013, 1,349 in 2012).
212.
See, e.g., 2015 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 5 (60% in 2015);
2013 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 9 (56.8% in 2013). For more on the access
right, see supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
213.
See 2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 6 (“The vast majority of
complaints concluded in 2014 were resolved amicably through the efforts of the Office
without the need for a formal decision . . . ”).
214.
See 2013 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 10 (29 formal decisions
out of 1,290 completed investigations of complaints); 2012 ODPC Annual Report, supra note
210, at 9 (36 formal decisions out of 864 completed investigations of complaints); 2011
ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 9 (17 formal decisions out of 1,080 completed
investigations of complaints).
215.
See 2011 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 39–40.
216.
Id.; see Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 3 (a).
217.
See 2011 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 39–40 (Swan Leisure case
study).
218.
See 2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 20–21.
219.
Id.
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Finally, in addition to the statistics and case studies from annual reports,
statements of ODPC leaders clearly embrace a strategy of responsive regulation.
The current Commissioner, Helen Dixon, spent 11 years working in the Irish
outposts of U.S. technology companies before becoming a civil servant in various
business-related government departments. 220 Since she began the job in late 2014,
Dixon has emphasized collaborative techniques as the cornerstone of her approach.
In her cover letter in her first ODPC annual report, she expressed her philosophy in
terms that sound very much like Ayres and Braithwaite, and thus are worth quoting
at length:
Given the pace and scale of change, I believe it is essential for dataprotection authorities to have strong relationships with stakeholders,
and regular meaningful dialogue. The engaged approach adopted by
my Office means data-protection problems can be detected, and either
solved or eliminated, before they affect a greater number of people
than would otherwise be the case. . . . Engagement also means that an
independent regulator, such as my Office, is better able to guide
meaningfully and consistently, over time, the broader development of
data protection for the improved benefit of all parties.
Sometimes, of course, effective data-protection regulation is best
carried out through the use of our statutory powers. . . . While the
explicit use of these tools can be measured, as they are in this report,
the implicit threat of their use to ensure compliance is also very
useful, though necessarily harder to capture statistically. 221

In adopting this posture, Dixon is continuing the approach of her
predecessor, Hawkes, who served as Commissioner from 2005 to 2014. In his first
annual report, he stated:
Generally, breaches of data protection legislation are unintentional
and the majority of data controllers are happy to correct any practices
that contravene our legislation.
For the majority of compliant data controllers, my approach is one of
helping them to achieve better respect for privacy by offering targeted
guidance. For the minority who [wilfully] or carelessly infringe
people’s privacy rights, my approach is to use the full extent of my
powers to achieve quick correction of such behavior.222

220.
See Elaine Edwards, Helen Dixon Appointed as Data Protection
Commissioner,
IRISH
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2014,
4:43
PM),
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/helen-dixon-appointed-as-dataprotection-commissioner-1.1924161.
221.
2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 2–3.
222.
DATA PROT. COMM’R, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DATA COMMISSIONER 6,
https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/annualreports/AnnualReport2005-EN.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 ODPC Annual Report]. Hawkes has been quoted in other sources discussing
similar work. See Burrell, supra note 2 ( “Most of our work is done behind closed doors
without publicity but with the outcome being exactly what we want”); Mirani, supra note 2 (
“Our approach is to talk to companies, explain exactly what we expect of them [and] expect
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Statistics, case studies, and policy statements from the regulating authority
all demonstrate the pervasive use of responsive privacy regulation by the ODPC.
The ODPC found “excessive” data collection by the leisure centre and the letting
agency to be unlawful under the Data Protection Act. 223 The same practices by the
same types of entities probably would not violate U.S. consumer protection law
absent a broken promise, and no other privacy law would be likely to apply. But the
fact that the underlying rules are more stringent in Ireland than in the U.S. does not
automatically lead to a harsher regulatory response.
What sort of “shotgun behind the door” is available to the ODPC in
instances where it must move higher on the regulatory pyramid? Unlike some other
E.U. data protection laws, the Irish Data Protection Act does not give the ODPC
direct authority to impose financial penalties without judicial participation. 224 This
will change under the GDPR, which confers authority on all national data protection
regulators to levy very large fines—up to 4% of a company’s annual global
revenue.225 That may improve the ODPC’s influence over businesses at the top of
the responsive regulation pyramid.226
Under the Act, the ODPC wields other weapons.227 Using its investigative
powers, the ODPC may inspect the premises and computer systems of data
processors at “all reasonable times” and may seize data for investigative purposes.228
The commissioner also may issue a broad form of subpoena, allowing the ODPC to
issue compulsory “information notices” to investigate potential data protection
violations.229 If the ODPC’s efforts to reach a reasonable settlement fail, it may issue
an “enforcement notice” requiring remedial actions. 230 Typical demands of an
enforcement notice might include changes in data practices, staff training, and
correction or deletion of the personal data at issue. 231
they will follow that. But if they don’t, we have some of the strongest enforcement powers of
any European data protection authority.”).
223.
See Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 2(1)(c)(iii); Irish Data
Protection Act, supra note 51, §3(a).
224.
See Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, §31; see, e.g., Lombarte,
supra note 20, at 124; Dutch Law Includes General Data Breach Notification Obligation and
Larger Fines for Violations of Data Protection Act, HUNTON & WILLIAMS: PRIVACY & INFO.
SECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2016/01/08/dutchlaw-includes-general-data-breach-notification-obligation-and-larger-fines-for-violations-ofthe-data-protection-act/; Julia Floretti, German Privacy Regulator Fines Three Firms Over
U.S. Data Transfers, REUTERS (June 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germanydataprotection-usa-idUSKCN0YS23H.
225.
See infra notes 376–78 and accompanying text (explaining new GDPR penalty
structure).
226.
See infra Section V.A.2 (discussing top-of-pyramid penalties in both the
United States and Ireland).
227.
Hawkes has even called them “some of the strongest enforcement powers of
any European data protection authority.” Mirani, supra note 2.
228.
Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 24.
229.
Id. § 12.
230.
Id. § 10(2).
231.
See CAREY, supra note 56, at 157.
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Failures to cooperate with lawful inspections or to comply with information
or enforcement notices are punishable offenses. 232 The ODPC can pursue
prosecution of these infractions in court with summary proceedings, which it has
done several hundred times over the years. 233 Maximum fines in such cases are
limited to either €3,000 or €5,000, depending on the rules violated.234 An extremely
serious case could result in criminal indictment and fines up to €100,000 in ordinary
cases and up to €250,000 for violations involving certain electronic privacy rules. 235
These investigative and enforcement powers are the underpinning of the
comprehensive data protection audits the ODPC uses to examine organizations of
all sizes.236 The Facebook investigation discussed in Part IV was such an audit, and
the ODPC subsequently conducted a similar audit of LinkedIn. 237 Other audits of
companies in recent years have ranged from a trash collection company called Panda
Waste to a collection of local credit unions. 238 Government entities, including the
national police force and the driver’s license bureau, have also been subjected to
ODPC audits. 239 In 2014, the ODPC inspected or audited 38 organizations
altogether.240 Overall, the ODPC has relied for leverage on its power to investigate
and perhaps ultimately to damage an organization’s reputation and goodwill more
than on the relatively small and uncommon financial penalties possible under current
Irish law.241
A final component of responsive regulation is an emphasis on offering
education and guidance to help entities bring themselves into compliance with legal
requirements. 242 The ODPC devotes considerable resources to these activities.
According to the most recent annual report, the ODPC responded to 860 requests
for information or assistance with compliance and engaged in 100 more formal
consultations with public and private organizations. 243 It publishes multiple
guidance documents, including a 16-page booklet entitled A Guide for Data
232.
See Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, §§ 10(9), 12(5), 24(6).
233.
See CAREY, supra note 56, at 156.
234.
Id. at 161.
235.
Id.
236.
OFFICE DATA PROT. COMM’R, Guide to Audit Process 6–7 (Aug. 2014),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/GuidetoAuditProcessAug2014.pdf.
237.
See Sara Harrington, Privacy and Data Protection Review of LinkedIn Ireland:
Some New Features to Know About, LINKEDIN: OFFICIAL BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://blog.linkedin.com/2014/12/18/privacy-and-data-protection-review-of-linkedinireland-some-new-features-to-know-about.
238.
See 2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 10. (discussing the
ODPC’s target of local credit unions); 2013 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 25
(noting the ODPC’s audit of Panda Waste).
239.
See 2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 10 (discussing the ODPC’s
audit of An Garda Síochána and the National Driver License Service Center).
240.
Id. at 5.
241.
See supra note 233–235.
242.
In 1992, Bennett reported that the German data protection regulator “takes
pride in the fact that it serves an educative and advisory function.” BENNETT, supra note 18,
at 183.
243.
2015 Annual Report, supra note 210, at 12–13.
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Controllers, which lays out fundamental principles of data protection law and closes
with a checklist for privacy compliance.244 While the ODPC offers less material than
is available on the FTC website, it is clearly a point of emphasis for the ODPC to
help regulated parties understand the law, answer their own questions, and improve
their compliance voluntarily.
B. The United States: The FTC
As noted before, narrow sectoral statutes in the U.S. give subject-specific
regulators the authority to promulgate privacy rules and often create data protection
regimes in their areas of expertise. For example, HIPAA authorizes the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to regulate data handling by
covered healthcare entities, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”) gives the U.S. Department of Education power to regulate student
records at public and private educational institutions. 245
Relying on regulators familiar with the particular concerns of the regulated
industry has both advantages and drawbacks. Presumably HHS understands
hospitals and the Department of Education understands schools better than an allpurpose DPA, such as the ODPC, understands either. On the other hand, such
division can also lead to fragmented power and reinvented wheels. And overlapping
authority may cause regulatory competition between agencies, which can have both
good and bad effects.246 The merits of the sectoral approach have been the subject
of debate, on which this Article expresses no view. But the differences in national
approaches to the issue are consistent with the philosophies discussed in Part I: the
E.U. considers data protection a unified area of law protecting a fundamental right,
while in the U.S., privacy risk is a characteristic of particular transactions that should
be addressed in that context.
For the vast majority of firms that fall outside these more heavily regulated
sectors, the U.S. takes a consumer protection approach to privacy, and the
preeminent agency enforcing those requirements is the FTC.
Unlike Ireland’s Data Protection Act, the structure of the FTC Act does not
explicitly instruct the agency to pursue friendly regulatory techniques. If anything,
the statute presupposes that the FTC will do most of its work through adversarial
enforcement actions. This was especially so after Congress made it prohibitively
difficult for the Commission to promulgate regulations interpreting Section 5 in the

244.
DATA PROT. COMM’R, Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003; A Guide for Data
Controllers
3–5,
15,
https://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/forms/NewAGuideForDataControllers.pdf.
245.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2010) (conferring power to HHS under HIPAA); 20
U.S.C. § 1232(c)(g) (2016) (conferring power to the Department of Education under FERPA).
246.
See generally REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Francesco Parisi et al., Two Dimensions of
Regulatory Competition, 26 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 56 (2004).
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ordinary way under the Administrative Procedure Act.247 That left adjudication as
the FTC’s primary formal power to police consumer protection violations under
Section 5. The FTC nonetheless uses responsive regulation to exercise this authority,
both in its approach to enforcement and in its other activities.
The FTC accepts complaints from the public, and may use them to identify
enforcement targets or gather evidence. 248 But there is no legal obligation for the
FTC to resolve individual complaints; indeed, it warns consumers that it may take
no action in response.249 The FTC can and does commence investigations on its own
initiative, or at the suggestion of the target company’s competitors. 250 Like the
ODPC, the FTC has a range of information-gathering techniques at its disposal,
including voluntary requests (backed, of course, by the implied threat of punitive
action and the desire of the target company to engender goodwill) and various forms
of compulsory process.251
Enforcement actions concerning privacy and security routinely result in
negotiated agreements with the targeted company. 252 In recent years, just three
companies have chosen to dispute the FTC’s privacy or security claims before a
judge (either in an administrative process or in district court)253—out of some 170
such complaints.254 All the others accepted consent decrees creating binding legal
obligations, which generally include ongoing FTC review of the company’s
compliance. The FTC’s formal procedures for the formation and content of consent
orders are rather skeletal.255 In practice, the informal negotiations center on remedial
actions. The FTC has developed stock language for the remedies commonly
included in consent decrees, particularly for a company’s adoption of a 20-year
“privacy compliance program” that incorporates dedicated management of privacy
247.
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 101–02. The FTC can write regulations in
the traditional manner when using its authority under other statutes, such as COPPA. See
generally 16 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2015).
248.
See Submit a Consumer Complaint to the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
249.
Id.
250.
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 103.
251.
See id. at 105–09.
252.
See id. at 111; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 606, 610.
253.
Two of the cases ended in rulings by federal appeals courts upholding the
FTC’s power over privacy and security. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d
236, 257 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting a challenge to FTC authority over data security under
Section 5); FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
FTC may enforce Section 5 against unfair trade practices whether or not those practices also
violate other provisions of law). The third case went through the administrative process within
the FTC. In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215, at *32 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016)
(overturning an administrative law judge who had ruled that the FTC failed to prove an unfair
trade practice arising from inadequate data security and imposing a remedial order). An
appeal of the third case is now pending in the Eleventh Circuit.
254.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 610.
255.
See 16 C.F.R. §§2.31–2.34 (requiring an agreement to cease and desist and
stating that the FTC may establish compliance procedures).
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compliance, development of policies, periodic outside audits, and access for the FTC
to inspect continued adherence to the program. 256
These FTC techniques adhere closely to Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid
model for responsive regulation. The regulatory agency acts under the starting
assumption that the regulated party intends to do its best to comply with the law.
Initial contacts are often voluntary and oriented toward remediation. The resolution
for a first offense is worked out privately between FTC staff and the target of the
investigation; the complaint and the consent decree typically are unveiled
simultaneously, and although the public may comment on the proposed remedy, in
practice this is just a formality before the ratification of the agreed settlement. 257
Once a company is under a consent decree—and remember, 20-year
durations are common—the FTC gains greater leverage, moving that company,
which has failed once, higher up the pyramid. The ongoing internal compliance
program and outside audits, along with the FTC’s power to inspect them, combine
to put the company on a sort of probation. Crucially, although the FTC cannot
impose fines for violations of Section 5, once a company is under a consent decree,
subsequent violations of the consent decree carry potentially significant fines:
$16,000 per individual violation, which might be multiplied by thousands or even
millions of users, and levied on a daily basis for continuing violations.258
Google learned about graduated penalties in the responsive regulation
pyramid the hard way. In October 2011, just before the Facebook settlement
discussed in Part IV, Google accepted a consent decree concerning privacy
violations in the rollout of Google Buzz, one of its several failed attempts to develop
a social networking platform.259 That order rather broadly required that Google not
“misrepresent in any manner, expressly or by implication . . . the extent to which
respondent maintains and protects the privacy and confidentiality of any covered
information . . . .” 260 Ten months later, the FTC reached a new settlement with
Google, this time for falsely stating that it respected a default setting in the Safari
browser that blocked certain third-party cookies. 261 The complaint in the second
action did not base liability on a violation of Section 5, although certainly a
deceptive practices claim might have been brought in the circumstances. Rather, the
FTC accused Google of violating the previous consent order.262 Because this second
infraction was now subject to a fine, Google was forced to pay a civil monetary
256.
See, e.g., In re Snapchat, No. C-4501, 2014 WL 7495798, at *7–11 (F.T.C.
Dec. 23, 2014) (consent order); In re Facebook, No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3518628, at *79–83
(F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2012) (consent order) [hereinafter FTC Facebook Order], In re Google, 152
F.T.C. 435 (2011), 2011 WL 11798458, at *9–12 (consent order).
257.
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 111 (“The FTC politely acknowledges
public comment, but such comment almost never alters the settlement agreement.”).
258.
See 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(c); HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 115.
259.
In re Google, 2011 WL 11798458, at *1–5.
260.
Id. at *5.
261.
United States v. Google, No CV12-04177SI, 2012 WL 5833994, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 16, 2012).
262.
Compl. Civil Remedies at ¶¶ 51, 54, 57, United States v. Google, 2012 WL
5833994 (2012) (No. CV12-04177SI), 2012 WL 3234957.
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penalty of $22.5 million as part of the settlement. 263 The chair of the FTC sounded
the theme of graduated penalties in a statement about the second enforcement action:
The record setting penalty in this matter sends a clear message to all
companies under an FTC privacy order. No matter how big or small,
all companies must abide by FTC orders against them and keep their
privacy promises to consumers, or they will end up paying many
times what it would have cost to comply in the first place.264

While more study would be necessary to test this theory, it is quite plausible
that the lack of a monetary penalty in the first enforcement action encourages
settlement. A company facing the prospect of a significant fine might logically
expend legal fees to fight the FTC.265 Instead, the cost of any such dispute naturally
exceeds the zero direct penalty that the company would be charged. There are other
incentives, of course.266 A company reduces uncertainty by settling, and even gains
some influence over its future obligations through the negotiations over terms.
Furthermore, by biting the bullet and settling, a company can reduce the public
relations damage caused by public airing of government accusations of poor datahandling practices, enduring just one bad story in the press instead of a protracted
dispute. Finally, because consent decrees invariably allow the company not to admit
fault, they can reduce both reputational harm and the risk of subsequent legal
liability.
Whatever the incentives to settle, once a company has done so, it finds itself
higher on the regulatory pyramid—subject to greater oversight, more specific
obligations, and more significant financial penalties for future privacy failures. The
FTC has methodically reached consent decrees with many digital technology firms,
including not only Facebook and Google, but also Microsoft, Twitter, Snapchat, and
Oracle, to name a few.267 By accumulating consent decrees, the FTC has entrenched
its role as a regulatory auditor, which encourages companies, in turn, to develop
internal compliance mechanisms.268
Over time, the violations alleged in FTC complaints and the conditions
established in consent decrees offer other regulated companies a picture of the
Commission’s expectations concerning privacy and security. 269 Steven Hetcher
explained the early FTC embrace of online privacy policies as a form of norm
263.
Google, 2012 WL 5833994, at *2.
264.
Press Release, FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it
Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9,
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented (quoting FTC Chair Jon Leibowitz).
265.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 611–12 (noting this possibility).
266.
See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 111 (considering reasons for companies to
settle with the FTC).
267.
See Cases and Proceedings: Advanced Search, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/advanced-search (input name of
company in Search box) (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
268.
See Cohen, supra note 15, at 27.
269.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 607–08 (arguing that this system
resembles common law).
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entrepreneurship that simultaneously defined privacy responsibilities for companies
and expanded the FTC’s power.270 These consent decrees work in just the same way
by establishing new expectations for privacy, for both the specific target companies
and others, 271 and solidifying the FTC’s enforcement authority over them. New
consent decrees are major events within the emerging specialized privacy
compliance bar in the U.S., whose members assiduously analyze them. This role for
settlements helps to address any concerns that individualized resolutions under
responsive regulation might not establish clear and universally applicable legal
standards.272
Regulatory resources are always constrained, of course. Like all
enforcement agencies, the FTC must prioritize its cases, and an examination of its
chosen targets demonstrates some discernible and predictable patterns. The
Commission tends to go after larger companies (whose shortcomings affect the most
consumers), the most egregious offenses (which may be especially likely to cause
harm, and where enforcement action would be especially important to proscribe as
a warning to other firms), and infractions involving children’s privacy (where there
is also heightened harm, as well as clearer political consensus, and additional FTC
powers under COPPA). In other words, FTC enforcement targets the big guys, the
bad guys, and those who harm kids.273 The need to prioritize enforcement is part of
all regulatory approaches, not just the responsive ones, but it means that complaints
and consent decrees can only do part of the FTC’s job in policing privacy.
Consistent with the responsive regulation model, the FTC also issues a
significant quantity of guidance materials to help businesses understand their legal
responsibilities for privacy and security. For example, while the FTC was
investigating Facebook (and Google), it was completing a final version of a
sweeping report concerning privacy recommendations for companies. To create this
report, the FTC began with a series of roundtables in 2009 and 2010, leading to a
proposed staff report published for comment at the end of 2010.274 The final report
was issued in March 2012, months after the Facebook settlement.275 While it offered
270.
See Hetcher, supra note 18, at 2062.
271.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 619–25 (arguing that this system
resembles common law).
272.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
273.
See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 225. Cases involving a combination of
these factors are even more attractive to the FTC. The complaint against Snapchat involved
all three: an estimated 100 million users, including a large percentage of minors, who were
assured repeatedly that the recipients of pictures sent through the app could not retain them
despite multiple widely known methods to do just that. See Compl., In re Snapchat, (F.T.C.
Dec.
23,
2014)
(No.
C-4501)
2014
WL
7495798,
at
*7–11,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatcmpt.pdf.
274.
See
FTC
Privacy
Report,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/ftc-privacyreport (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
275.
Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Final Commission Report on Protecting
Consumer Privacy (March 26, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/03/ftc-issues-final-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy; see FTC,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
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a broad set of standards rather than detailed regulations, the 2012 FTC Report
emphasized the importance of developing new products, services, and features with
consideration of privacy from the earliest stages (so-called “privacy by design”276),
meaningful choice for consumers, and transparency and consistency about privacy
practices. 277 The report emphasized industry “best practices” rather than formal
legal compliance measures, maintained flexibility in the face of changing
technology, and drew insights from engagement with stakeholders to develop legal
expectations collaboratively.278
The 2012 FTC Report was a particularly ambitious effort to provide
guidance for businesses and their lawyers, but certainly not the only one. The FTC
website houses a “Business Center” with a separate page offering advice for
companies about privacy and security issues, ranging from two-minute videos and
short documents highlighting key issues, to a blog, to summaries of recent cases that
emphasize the takeaway points for other companies so they can avoid committing
the same violations.279 Two comprehensive but user-friendly guides for businesses
summarize best practices for data privacy and data security. 280 The FTC has also
convened over 35 topical workshops about privacy issues in the last 20 years and
issued dozens of reports. 281 Recent workshops and reports tended to focus on
emerging topics such as cross-device tracking282 or so-called “Big Data” analysis283
of personal information.
In summary, despite an authorizing statute that envisions primarily
adversarial enforcement actions, the FTC has embraced responsive regulation of
privacy at U.S.-based companies. It has thus emerged as the preeminent privacy
BUSINESSES
AND
POLICYMAKERS
(March
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2012 FTC Report].
276.
See generally Ira Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1409 (2012).
277.
2012 FTC Report, supra note 275, at 23–71.
278.
Id. at 16; see Thaw, supra note 15, at 336–42 (evaluating consultative elements
of FTC data security enforcement).
279.
The business-oriented materials span multiple interlinked pages, but for a good
starting point see Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/privacy-and-security (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
280.
See Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Nov. 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/all/libraries/infosecurity/; FTC, START
WITH
SECURITY;
A
GUIDE
FOR
BUSINESS
(June
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.
281.
See FTC, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2015 at 13–14,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update2015/privacy_and_security_data_update_2015-web_0.pdf.
282.
See, e.g., Cross-Device Tracking, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/11/cross-device-tracking.
283.
See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Report Provides Recommendations to
Business on Growing Use of Big Data (Jan. 6. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/01/ftc-report-provides-recommendations-business-growing-use-big-data.
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regulator in the United States, even though it did so using consumer protection
powers that have no particular focus on the handling of personal data.

IV. FACEBOOK: FRIENDING THE REGULATORS
In 2011, regulators in both the United States and Ireland conducted wideranging enforcement actions related to Facebook’s information-handling practices.
The FTC reached a settlement with Facebook and then simultaneously announced
to the public its complaint and a consent decree with a 20-year duration. 284
Meanwhile, the ODPC completed an audit of Facebook-Ireland, and released its
comprehensive results, documenting a series of required improvements in
Facebook’s practices and deadlines for their implementation. 285 These two
regulatory interventions, conducted simultaneously and completed within weeks of
one another, make a good comparative case study. They demonstrate the twin theses
of this Article: that a responsive regulation approach blurs the distinctions between
otherwise divergent substantive privacy law, and that it can be an effective method
to improve data practices.
Around the world, the law has struggled to deal with social media,
particularly Facebook. Anupam Chander has shown that Facebook’s breathtaking
global scale and nearly unique degree of interactivity often prompt people to use the
language of nationhood to describe it, and to ask: “Who rules Facebookistan?”286
The answer is complex, both because the platform governs itself to a great degree
through the design of its interface and its terms of use, 287 and because the relevant
jurisdictional rules can be extremely complex. 288 Chander chronicles a number of
attempts by legal systems in various nations to assert their authority over
Facebookistan, including not only the United States and Ireland, but also Germany,
France, Canada, China, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt. 289 A comprehensive investigation
of privacy on Facebook by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, completed in 2009,
presaged the findings of the FTC and ODPC in many respects.290 More recently,
284.
See Compl., In re Facebook, (2012) (No. C-4365), 2012 WL 3518628,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookcmpt.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Facebook Complaint]; FTC Facebook Order, supra note 256. The
agreement was announced on Nov. 29, 2011. Press Release, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC
Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-itdeceived-consumers-failing-keep.
285.
ODPC Facebook Audit, supra note 196, at 3–20.
286.
ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD 113–14 (2013).
287.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1997).
288.
See KUNER, supra note 22, at 109–35.
289.
CHANDER, supra note 286, at 120–31.
290.
See generally ELIZABETH DENHAM, ASSISTANT PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN.,
REPORT OF FINDINGS INTO THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND
PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC (CIPPIC) AGAINST FACEBOOK INC. UNDER THE PERSONAL
INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT (July 16, 2009),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.asp.
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Facebook prevailed in an appeals court in its challenge against an enforcement
action by Belgium’s data protection regulator.291 Given Facebook’s vast scale, many
nations will attempt to influence its operations by asserting legal claims against it.
Responsive regulatory techniques offer a desirable method for doing so.
Facebook has always faced criticism and legal challenges over its
information-handling practices, even before it grew into “Facebookistan.” That was
already evident in the company’s infancy, when it was still available almost
exclusively to high school and college students, as explained by Time Magazine in
2006:
On Tuesday morning the popular social networking site unrolled a
new feature dubbed the “News Feed” that allows users to track their
friends’ Facebook movements by the minute. For many of
Facebook’s 8 million-plus student users, it was too much. Within 24
hours, hundreds of thousands of students nationwide organized
themselves to protest the new feature. Ironically, they’re using
Facebook to do it.292

Ten years later, of course, Facebook has quite a few more than eight million
users around the world, of all ages.293 News Feed, the continuous stream of items
posted by friends (and other sources chosen by the user), replaced an interface that
required a user to visit each friend’s profile page individually to see the latest
updates. It has since become a defining feature of the interface that helped fuel the
social network’s growth, now so central that it is difficult to imagine Facebook
functioning without it.294

291.
See Stephanie Bodoni & Aoife White, Facebook Wins Belgian Court Case
Over
Storing
Non-User
Data,
BLOOMBERG
TECH.
(June
29,
2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-29/facebook-wins-belgian-court-appealover-storing-non-user-data. The Belgian case involved the collection of aggregate data about
the activities of nonusers through Facebook’s “Like” buttons on other websites, see id., which
was also considered in the ODPC Facebook Audit, see supra note 196, at 81–83, and
previously had been the subject of enforcement actions by German state regulators, see
CHANDER, supra note 286, at 122–24.
292.
Tracy Samantha Schmidt, Inside the Backlash Against Facebook, TIME (Sept.
6, 2006), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1532225,00.html (describing the
formation of Facebook user groups to protest the News Feed and criticism in college
newspapers).
293.
Facebook claims to have “1.71 billion monthly active users as of June 30,
2016” and estimates that “84.5% of [its] daily active users are outside the US and Canada.”
See Newsroom: Stats, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Oct.
21, 2016).
294.
See Caitlin Dewey, After Eight Years With Facebook’s News Feed, There’s
No
Such
Thing
As
‘TMI,’
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
23,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/23/after-eight-years-withfacebooks-news-feed-theres-no-such-thing-as-tmi/; Farhad Manjoo, Facebook News Feed
Changed Everything, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles
/technology/technology/2013/09/facebook_news_feed_turns_7_why_it_s_the_most_influen
tial_feature_on_the.html.
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This early controversy over the News Feed exemplifies the broader
problem technology presents for privacy regulators: it is a fast-moving target. The
designers of every platform continually experiment with the organization and
distribution of personal information—including not only Facebook’s 2006 changes,
but such recent examples as LinkedIn sending emails to people in new members’
contact lists inviting them to join the service or Twitter’s experimentation with new
algorithmic sorting in users’ feeds.295
“Privacy lurches” can disorient users and depart from their expectations. 296
If new policies contradict previous commitments about privacy, the changes may
well be illegal under a consumer protection model. If they move beyond legitimizing
conditions, they might violate data protection law. These sorts of changes increase
the risks of accidental disclosures to unintended audiences—what human-computer
interaction scholar Kelly Caine calls “misclosures”297—that are already common
when using highly networked platforms with complicated interfaces, such as
Facebook.
Yet heavy-handed legal intervention against the shift to the News Feed
would have thwarted an innovation that has proven itself valuable to both the
company and its customers. The change was controversial at the time because, even
though personal information posted on a profile was still visible to exactly the same
audience of approved friends, making it much more readily accessible reduced
users’ “privacy by obscurity.”298 The company exacerbated the problem by failing
to recognize these privacy implications and rolling out the new feature too quickly,
with too little warning, and with an attitude that suggested its users’ reservations
were foolish.299 Over time, however, users have adjusted to the shift in information
flows and learned how to protect their privacy. They certainly did not, as some
observers predicted at the time, leave the service in droves. 300 Regulators must leave
295.
Perkins v. Linkedin Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(rejecting motion to dismiss class action lawsuit concerning LinkedIn’s practices in sending
reminder emails); Doug Bolton, Twitter is Experimenting with Putting Tweets Out of Order
in Users’ Timelines, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/twitter-timeline-out-of-order-test-experiment-a6765371.html.
296.
See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 915–16 (2013).
297.
Kelly E. Caine, Supporting Privacy by Preventing Misclosure, CHI ‘09
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS. 3145, *3147 (2009).
298.
See generally Woodrow Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2013).
299.
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerburg infamously responded to the uproar with
a somewhat snarky blog post defending the changes, entitled “Calm down. Breathe. We Hear
You.” Mark Zuckerburg, Calm Down. Breathe. We Hear You., FACEBOOK (Sept. 5, 2006),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/calm-down-breathe-we-hear-you/2208197130/
(“[W]e agree, stalking isn’t cool; but being able to know what’s going on in your friends’
lives is. . . . Nothing you do is being broadcast; rather, it is being shared with people who care
about what you do—your friends.”).
300.
See Claudine Beaumont, ‘Quit Facebook’ Protest Day Flops, TELEGRAPH
(June 1, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/7792970/QuitFacebook-protest-day-flops.html. Clearly, the staggering growth of the platform belies any
notion that privacy objections are driving away consumers in large numbers. For those who
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companies enough room to experiment, and users enough time to adjust, or risk
thwarting desirable improvements.
Facebook made another lurching change the next year that probably did
merit legal intervention. An initiative called Facebook Beacon allowed the social
network’s advertising partners to disclose information about a person’s online
activities outside of Facebook on the News Feeds of that person’s friends inside of
Facebook. 301 This type of “frictionless sharing,” which transmits automated
messages into Facebook by default rather than by a conscious user action, raises
many serious problems, including the risk of misclosures, the commercialization of
individual identity, and the “spammification” of user recommendations that
undermines their usefulness. 302 The backlash against Beacon was intense and
Facebook quickly reversed course.303 Founder Mark Zuckerburg later admitted the
entire effort was a mistake. 304 Class action lawsuits, based in large part on state
consumer protection law, soon followed; the company settled them promptly for
$9.5 million.305 U.S. regulators like the FTC took no public action as this dispute
unfolded, despite the clear privacy problems caused by Beacon.
The News Feed and Beacon controversies were the prologues to the
investigations by the ODPC and FTC, which generally focused on activities between
2009 and 2011. As illustrated by the two examples just discussed, Facebook had
exhibited a somewhat cavalier attitude about user data and a tendency toward
privacy lurches. It was also clear, however, that the social network was an evolving
concept and that a heavy-handed regulatory approach could forestall innovation and
create other problems. The two countries’ regulators acted against that backdrop.

do leave, there is conflicting empirical research about the significance of privacy among their
motivations. Compare Lee Rainie et al., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, COMING AND
GOING ON FACEBOOK 2 (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Coming_and_going_on_facebook.pdf (finding that 61% of
Facebook users took a break from using the service, but that only 4% of that group cited
concerns related to privacy, security, advertising, or spam as the reason), with Stefan Stieger
et al., Who Commits Virtual Identity Suicide? Differences in Privacy Concerns, Internet
Addiction, and Personality Between Facebook Users and Quitters, 16 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY,
BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 629, 629 (2013) (finding in study of people who had stopped
using Facebook that nearly half identified privacy concerns as a reason, by far the most
frequently offered explanation).
301.
See Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook Retreats on Online Tracking, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at C1.
302.
See William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 39–
49.
303.
See Bobbie Johnson, Facebook Backs Down Over Controversial Advertising
System,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
30,
2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/nov/30/facebook.beacon; Story & Stone,
supra note 301.
304.
See Peter Kafka, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg: Yep, Beacon Was a
Mistake, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2008), http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/5/livefacebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-at-d.
305.
See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816–17 (9th Cir. 2012).
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In December 2009, Facebook changed its architecture again and adjusted
its privacy policies accordingly. 306 As summarized later in the FTC’s complaint,
several of these changes altered the categories of personal information over which
users could restrict access, converting some to “publicly available” when users
previously could set those same categories as “visible” only to their friends or to
“friends of friends.”307 Meanwhile, some types of information became more readily
accessible to the makers of applications that run within Facebook, and the unique
Facebook ID was available to some advertisers—all allegedly with inadequate
disclosures of these facts by Facebook. 308 Moreover, some of these changes
automatically superseded previous user privacy settings that were stricter. 309
Facebook implemented the modifications by requiring every user to click through a
“Privacy Wizard” interface confirming privacy settings, but the FTC objected that
the Wizard presented the new policies in a misleading way. 310 Some of these policy
revisions were controversial immediately; privacy advocacy groups such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Center called on the FTC to investigate.311
As noted earlier, FTC privacy cases almost always settle, resulting in no
fine for a first infraction but requiring improvements in data-handling practices and
long-term FTC monitoring and internal compliance programs. 312 That is exactly
what happened after the FTC presented its complaint to Facebook. Like many other
privacy consent decrees entered by the FTC, Facebook’s also had a 20-year term,
and it obliged Facebook to establish a “comprehensive privacy program,” to conduct
biennial audits of its privacy performance, and to make certain records available to
the FTC on request. 313 In another resemblance to typical FTC consent decrees,
Facebook did not admit wrongdoing.
What sets the Facebook Order apart from most other consent decrees is a
set of conditions that the company “clearly and prominently” announce changes to
the mechanisms for disclosing users’ personal information.314 The consent decree
includes detailed requirements for these announcements, drawn from the FTC’s
consumer-protection expertise. 315 Facebook would not be subject to similar

306.
See Bobbie Johnson, Facebook Privacy Change Angers Campaigners,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
10,
2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/dec/10/facebook-privacy.
307.
See FTC Facebook Complaint, supra note 284, at ¶¶ 19–22.
308.
Id. at ¶¶ 30–40.
309.
Id. at ¶ 21.
310.
Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.
311.
See Johnson, supra note 306; Brad Stone, Privacy Group Files Complaint on
Facebook
Changes,
N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
BLOG
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/privacy-group-files-complaint-on-facebookprivacy-changes.
312.
See supra notes 252–56 and accompanying text.
313.
See FTC Facebook Order, supra note 256, at *79–83.
314.
Id. at *79.
315.
Id. at *78. For example, the consent decree specifies that disclosures “in
textual communications (e.g., printed publications or words displayed on the screen of a
computer or mobile device)” must be “of a type, size, and location sufficiently noticeable for
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restrictions under the FTC’s normal jurisdiction, so in effect, the Commission used
the settlement as leverage to increase Facebook’s substantive privacy
responsibilities for the following two decades. And, as usual, failure to meet these
heightened duties can now trigger a potentially significant fine. 316
Meanwhile, Facebook’s practices during the post-Beacon period were of
particular interest to the ODPC, because the company opened its European
headquarters in Dublin in 2008. After opening this subsidiary in Ireland, Facebook
altered its terms of service so that its contractual relationship with all users outside
the United States and Canada connected them to the Facebook-Ireland subsidiary,
rather than to the main U.S.-based company.317 There are now over 1,000 employees
in Facebook’s Dublin office, the biggest concentration outside its global
headquarters in Silicon Valley. 318 Under the current Data Protection Directive, the
presence of this rest-of-world headquarters gives Ireland primary jurisdiction over
the company’s data-handling practices.319
According to the ODPC, it unilaterally selected Facebook for a
comprehensive data protection audit at the beginning of 2011. 320 In August and
September of that year, a privacy advocacy group called Europe Versus Facebook
filed a series of 22 specific complaints about Facebook with the Commissioner. 321
Europe Versus Facebook was created by Maximilian Schrems, the Austrian privacy

an ordinary consumer to read and comprehend them, in print that contrasts highly with the
background on which they appear.” Id.
316.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
317.
See ODPC Facebook Audit, supra note 196, at 21.
318.
See Linsey Barber, In Pictures: Inside Facebook’s New Dublin Office and
European
HQ,
CITY
A.M.
(June
17,
2014,
2:56
PM),
http://www.cityam.com/blog/1403013362/inside-facebooks-new-european-hq-pictures
(nothing the Dublin office is the largest Facebook office outside the Silicon Valley); Pamela
Newenham, Facebook’s Irish Boss Accentuates the Positive, IRISH TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/facebook-s-irish-boss-accentuates-thepositive-1.2383770.
319.
See KUNER, supra note 22, at 117–18. The default rule under the Directive
uses the location of the establishment of a data controller as the primary jurisdiction. See E.U.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, art. 4, §1(a). The GDPR will continue that general
default rule, subject to some new oversight mechanisms. See GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 4,
§16(b), 56, §1; see also infra notes 379–85 and accompanying text (discussing national
regulators’ role under the GDPR).
320.
See ODPC Facebook Audit, supra note196, at 22.
321.
The Europe Versus Facebook webpage includes links to all 22 complaints
along with other documents related to its campaign against Facebook within the ODPC. Legal
Procedure Against Facebook Ireland Limited, EUROPE VERSUS FACEBOOK,
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/complaints.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2016).
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activist who colorfully criticized Ireland as the Cayman Islands of the data barons.322
These complaints were absorbed into the audit as well. 323
The ODPC Facebook Audit laid out a detailed set of changes and
improvements in Facebook’s data practices. The regulator and the company
negotiated over the list, and in the end, Facebook accepted the recommended
improvements.324 One of the major areas concerned the clarity of disclosures made
to users, especially in light of the complexity of Facebook’s privacy settings and
retroactive changes in them—precisely the issues central to the FTC inquiry. In
response, Facebook agreed to increase its transparency to users, with continued
follow-up from the ODPC to ensure that the improvements are sufficient.325 In some
instances, such changes were spelled out in great detail: for the then-novel feature
of suggested photo tags based on facial recognition, for example, Facebook was
required to provide additional notice to users under the following guidelines:
[The notice] will appear at the top of the page when a user logs in. If
the user interacts with it by selecting either option presented then it
will disappear for the user. If the user does not interact with it then it
will appear twice more for a total of 3 displays on the next successive
log-ins.326

Finally, like the FTC, the ODPC established an ongoing process for
monitoring compliance. As a start, the regulator conducted a follow-up audit the
next year to assess Facebook’s progress toward promised improvements. 327 It found
that “most of the recommendations have been implemented to [the ODPC’s]
satisfaction” and for the remainder it provided detailed work plans for Facebook to
cooperate with the ODPC in meeting those goals by specified deadlines. 328
Overall, the ODPC was sufficiently satisfied with the results of its
interactions with Facebook to use the same model again in 2014, when it completed
a similar audit of the Irish headquarters of another social networking platform,
LinkedIn. 329 Dixon has indicated her intention for the ODPC to conduct similar
audits of Apple, Adobe, and Yahoo! in the near future. 330

322.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For more about Schrems, see
Kashmir Hill, Max Schrems: The Austrian Thorn in Facebook’s Side, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/the-austrian-thorn-in-facebooks-side/.
323.
See ODPC Facebook Audit, supra note 196, at 22.
324.
See id. at 5–20.
325.
Id.
326.
Id. at 105.
327.
See DATA PROT. COMM’R, FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD.: REPORT OF RE-AUDIT
(Sept.
21,
2012),
https://dataprotection.ie/documents/press/facebook_ireland_audit_review_report_21_sept_2
012.pdf [hereinafter ODPC Facebook Re-Audit].
328.
Id. at 3–4.
329.
See 2014 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 10.
330.
See Conor Humphries, Irish Regulator of Apple, Facebook Eyes Power To
Levy Huge Fines, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eudataprotection-ireland-interview-idUSKBN0LL1PF20150219. The ODPC conducted 51
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Understandably, Facebook presented the results of the two investigations
in the best possible light. It is intriguing how closely the company’s statements
adhere to the responsive regulation playbook. In a long blog post the day the FTC
settlement was announced, Zuckerberg cast it in terms of dialogue and improvement
and pointedly placed Facebook alongside other large digital technology companies:
As we have grown, we have tried our best to listen closely to the
people who use Facebook. We also work with regulators, advocates
and experts to inform our privacy practices and policies. Recently,
the [FTC] established agreements with Google and Twitter that are
helping to shape new privacy standards for our industry. Today, the
FTC announced a similar agreement with Facebook. These
agreements create a framework for how companies should approach
privacy in the United States and around the world.
For Facebook, this means we’re making a clear and formal long-term
commitment to do the things we’ve always tried to do and planned to
keep doing—giving you tools to control who can see your
information and then making sure only those people you intend can
see it.331

Notice in particular how this statement envisions a cooperative effort
between the regulator and companies to “shape new privacy standards for our
industry.”332 Facebook, by friending the FTC, is pulling it closer. In return, however,
the FTC gets powerful influence over the design of privacy rules throughout the
industry. When discussing the Irish audit, a senior official at Facebook-Ireland
similarly emphasized areas where the ODPC found its practices laudable:
Of course, Facebook is always looking to improve our privacy
policies and practices, and the [ODPC’s] review of our existing
operations highlighted several opportunities to strengthen our
existing practices. Facebook has committed to either implement, or
to consider, other “best practice” improvements recommended by the
[ODPC], even in situations where our practices already comply with
legal requirements.333

Again, the ethos of responsive regulation permeates this statement. Rather
than focusing on the specific details of rules, Facebook highlights advice from and
communication with the ODPC and describes improvements as steps toward best
audits and inspections in 2015. See 2015 ODPC Annual Report, supra note 210, at 10. It
reportedly began an audit of Adobe in 2016. See Adrian Weckler, Facebook Forced to
Introduce New Privacy Settings by Irish Authorities, INDEPENDENT.IE (June 21, 2016),
http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/facebook-forced-to-introduce-new-privacysettings-by-irish-authorities-34819193.html.
331.
Mark Zuckerburg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 29, 2011), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2011/11/our-commitment-to-the-facebookcommunity/.

332.
333.

Id.

Richard Allan, Facebook and the Irish Data Protection Commission,
(Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-public-policyeurope/facebook-and-the-irish-data-protection-commission/288934714486394.
FACEBOOK

2016]

PRIVACY REGULATORS

1011

practices, not as the fulfillment of legal obligations. The same official told the BBC,
“This is business as usual for us. Individuals raise concerns and take them to the
regulatory authorities and we have a conversation with them.”334
These friendly resolutions drew critics in both Ireland and the United
States. According to Hawkes, some other European regulators objected to the
outcome of the Facebook audit.335 Much of the reaction to the FTC consent decree
was likewise unimpressed, particularly in the heated world of technology blogs. A
story on the website for Wired Magazine epitomized the common journalistic
takeaway, calling it a “win for Facebook” and noting pointedly that the company
was not required to admit fault.336 The article began:
Facebook is settling government charges it “deceived” users that their
information would be kept private, although it was “repeatedly”
shared with the public, the [FTC] announced Tuesday.
The deal, which carries no financial penalties, demands that the
social-networking site obtain “express consent” of their 850 million
users before their information “is shared beyond the privacy settings
they have established.”337

These criticisms focused on the lack of a clear punishment for Facebook.
But responsive regulation does not depend on punishments to achieve results, and
Facebook’s overall privacy performance has improved considerably since 2011.
Most significantly, Facebook has greatly expanded and formalized its
privacy compliance functions. As part of this effort, every product manager now
receives intensive privacy training and an internal privacy team carefully monitors
the design of new features.338 The creation of this “comprehensive privacy program”
is very much in line with the recommendations of both the FTC and the ODPC. The
involvement with product development epitomizes the FTC’s “privacy by design”
mantra.339
On its own initiative, without specific mandates from either regulator,
Facebook also developed a new “privacy checkup tool,” depicted in Figure 1, that
periodically interrupts users when they log in and directs them to evaluate their
334.
Irish Privacy Watchdog Calls for Facebook Changes, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16289426.
335.
See Mark Tighe, Data Commissioner: I Was Not Too Soft on Facebook,
SUNDAY
TIMES
(UK)
(Jan.
7,
2012),
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ireland/News/Irish_News/article853298.ece.
336.
David Kravets, FTC Slaps Facebook’s Hand Over Privacy Deception, WIRED
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/ftc-slaps-facebook-privacy/.
337.
Id. Technology bloggers reacted similarly to a more recent consent decree
involving social network privacy, this one against Snapchat. One story began: “The [FTC]
today effectively told technology companies: Go ahead and lie to consumers about your
privacy protections, because even if you get caught, the most you’ll have to do is apologize.”
Larson, supra note 4.
338.
See Kashmir Hill, The Guy Standing Between Facebook and Its Next Privacy
Disaster, FUSION (Feb. 4, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/41870/facebook-privacy-yul-kwon/.
339.
See supra notes 267–271 and accompanying text.
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settings before proceeding. 340 The tool, 341 pictured below, ensures that users
reassess their own privacy—because not only might the architecture of Facebook
change, but the individual user’s preferences, habits, and personal relationships may
alter over time.

Figure 1: The Facebook Privacy Checkup Tool.
As a final indication of its increasing privacy consciousness, Facebook was
the first large platform to require a search warrant for government investigators’
requests for user data, rather than handing it over voluntarily. 343 This last position
may not be one that government regulators value, but it is important to users.
The FTC and ODPC have continued to scrutinize Facebook since their
2011 investigations. In 2013, Facebook again altered its privacy policy. 344 U.S.
340.
Jessica Guynn, Facebook Rolling Out Privacy Checkup for Users, USA Today
(Sept.
4,
2014,
4:50
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2014/09/04/facebook-privacy-checkup-tool/15067743/.
341.
In addition to prompting users periodically to complete the “checkup,”
Facebook also made the tool available from every user’s toolbar. See What’s The Privacy
Checkup and How Can I Find It?, FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/443357099140264 (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
343.
See generally Who Has Your Back? 2013, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2013 (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (stating the
organizations was “particularly impressed by the firm stance Facebook takes” on this issue).
EFF issues annual reports about platforms’ practices in response to government requests for
user data. For the most recent (and links to earlier years’ reports), see Who Has Your Back?
2016, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2016 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2016).
344.
Vindu Goel, Facebook to Update Privacy Policy, But Adjusting Settings is No
Easier,
N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
BLOG
(Aug.
29,
2013),
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privacy advocacy groups sent a letter to the FTC (not quite a formal complaint, but
with similar effect) arguing that the Commission should block the new rules. 345 With
considerable publicity, the FTC let it be known that it was inquiring into whether
the new policy violated the 2011 agreement. 346 This was part of the continued
scrutiny envisioned in the consent decree, and in response, Facebook hastily
explained that the new policy language was merely an attempt to clarify terms
without changing them substantively—one of the goals embodied pervasively in
both the FTC and ODPC actions.347 Facebook eventually agreed to further changes
in response to the regulators’ concerns.348
More recently, the FTC and other regulators expressed concern about
Facebook’s activities in connection with its acquisition of the popular messaging
platform WhatsApp. After the WhatsApp transaction in 2014, the FTC
proactively—and publicly—wrote to Facebook and invoked both Section 5 and the
consent decree, warning, “[I]f you choose to use data collected by WhatsApp in a
manner that is materially inconsistent with the promises WhatsApp made at the time
of collection, you must obtain consumers’ affirmative consent before doing so.”349
In August 2016, the company announced that some personal data about WhatsApp
customers, which had remained segregated from the rest of Facebook’s data, would
henceforth be shared.350 Individual users received clear notice of the change from
prompts in the app that required them to accept the new terms and allowed them to

http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/facebook-to-update-privacy-policy-but-adjustingsettings-is-no-easier/.
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Monitoring,
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See FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 252 (17th ed. 2016).
349.
Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir. of FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., to Erin
Egan, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook Inc., and to Anne Hoge, Gen. Counsel, WhatsApp
Inc.
3
(April
10,
2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/297701/140410facebookwh
atappltr.pdf (“Failure to take these steps could constitute a violation of Section 5 and/or the
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2014),
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https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000627/Looking-ahead-for-WhatsApp.
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opt out of the data disclosures. 351 The FTC has indicated that it will “carefully
review” these changes.352 That evaluation will boil down to deciding whether the
opt-out procedures Facebook offered were close enough to the requirements of the
2011 consent decree and the FTC’s 2014 call for “affirmative consent.”
The new WhatsApp policy attracted considerable negative commentary.353
But analysis of the changes will require a careful and nuanced balance: keeping
individuals informed and in control of their personal data, while letting technology
businesses evolve to offer innovative services and—not incidentally—make money.
It is a close call. The conscientious rollout of these changes shows Facebook has
come a long way from its privacy lurches prior to 2011. Collaborative engagement
by regulators such as the FTC will be more likely to resolve the question than a
simplistic ex ante rule or premature resort to punitive measures.
The Irish regulator similarly continued its use of collaborative techniques,
before, during, and after its audit. Ever since the Dublin office opened, the ODPC
and Facebook have both continuously emphasized their ongoing discussions about
data protection practices. For example, the audit report highlighted a visit by thenCommissioner Hawkes to Facebook’s U.S. headquarters in 2010. 354 Dixon, the
current Commissioner, has stated more recently that her staff continues to be in
weekly and sometimes daily contact with Facebook-Ireland.355 As already noted, the
ODPC conducted and published a 2012 follow-up audit assessing Facebook’s
progress in making improvements from the original audit.356 And in 2016, Facebook
made a number of changes in its configuration in response to “intense engagement”
with the ODPC.357
In the abstract, such constant communication between the regulator and
one of the most significant businesses under its authority could be seen as either
excessively chummy or intensively meddlesome, depending on the circumstances
and one’s point of view. Here, it appears to be neither. Consistent with a responsive

351.
See How Do I Choose Not to Share My Account Information With Facebook
to Improve My Facebook Ads and Products Experiences?, WHATSAPP FAQ,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/general/26000016 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016); see also Jules
Polonetsky, What’s Up With WhatsApp and Facebook?, LINKEDIN (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/whats-up-app-facebook-jules-polonetsky.
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See Jeff John Roberts, Facebook’s Plan for WhatsApp to Get Close Look from
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See supra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.
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See Weckler, supra note 330.
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regulation model, Facebook kept regulators informed of its activities and they, in
turn, helped the company stay within the boundaries of acceptable practices.
By friending the privacy regulators, Facebook availed itself of an
authoritative source to consult about its legal obligations and protected itself from
future penalties. If Facebook is in constant contact with a regulator and following
its advice, how can that regulator then complain about Facebook’s actions?
From a regulator’s perspective, this outcome should be counted as a
success.358 Facebook has established the elaborate compliance monitoring the FTC
wanted, and the consent decree gives the FTC continued leverage over Facebook
until it expires in 2032. Facebook also continues to consult the ODPC about its
obligations. After all, the regulators’ goal is to improve data privacy practices, and
Facebook is now obeying the law as the FTC and the ODPC interpret it. Moreover,
responsive regulation achieves that goal in a way that keeps costs low both for the
government and for the job-creating economic engine at Facebook.
The flexible outcomes of the two regulatory interventions, along with the
continued consultation they established, also mean that privacy requirements on
Facebook can continue to adapt as the technology, business methods, and cultural
expectations of social media continue to change. A ruling that bluntly forbids an
innovation might inadvertently prevent beneficial developments, such as the
creation of the News Feed. Using responsive regulation, the FTC and ODPC can
intervene to discuss new features and policies, offer alternate views, and promote
privacy. Indeed, they can effectively require such changes, because Facebook is now
subject to greater scrutiny in the middle portion of the regulatory pyramid.
Finally, the regulatory friendship allows Facebook to present itself to the
world as privacy-conscious—but this good publicity comes at the price that it in fact
maintain strong practices, or the resulting legal and reputational harm could be
especially serious. In other words, by allowing their new friends at Facebook to brag
about data practices, the regulators have helped maximize the business incentives
for continued advancement of privacy.

V. LESSONS AND FUTURE STUDY
This final Part considers some of the lessons emerging from this study of
responsive regulation in data privacy enforcement and the next steps toward
understanding it. Section A discusses three lessons about the effectiveness of this
regulatory strategy that we can learn from the implementation of the model in
Ireland and the United States. Section B briefly notes some avenues for future study
of this insufficiently theorized area.

358.
Hawkes, who ran ODPC during the audit, certainly views it that way, as “an
example of the use of enforcement powers that did not have to be backed up by more coercive
measures.” Hawkes, supra note 169, at 450–52 (assessing the ODPC Facebook Audit).
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A. Lessons
1. Resources
Responsive regulation is often championed because it is cost-effective in
comparison to command-and-control rulemaking and adversarial proceedings.
While that is true, successful responsive regulation is not cheap either. In particular,
successful privacy enforcement necessitates the resources to obtain technical
expertise.359
According to Hawkes, completion of the ODPC Facebook Audit required
three months of full-time work by one-third of his entire staff, which totaled only 22
people at the time.360 That level of engagement could overwhelm an office that was
a relatively sleepy operation for many years. Until recently, the ODPC’s budget and
staff were designed to oversee “leisure centres” and “letting agencies” 361 —not
global technology behemoths like Facebook. 362
To the derision of its critics, the ODPC has long been headquartered over
a Centra convenience store in the small village of Portarlington in County Laois, 75
kilometers southwest of Dublin. 363 This unusual location resulted from a past
government’s short-lived decentralization policy that moved offices outside the
capital,364 but some viewed the backwater location as proof that the ODPC was not
up to the job of policing technology multinationals. 365
In 2015, the Irish government initiated a massive increase in the resources
and status of the ODPC. That year, the budget grew from €1.8 million to €3.65
million, and the number of employees rose from 29 to 50.366 In 2017, the ODPC’s
budget is slated for another enormous gain, to over €7.5 million (equivalent to over
$8 million)—quadruple the 2014 budget. 367 The current government also made
organizational changes to upgrade the ODPC’s institutional status and bureaucratic

359.
See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 177.
360.
See Tighe, supra note 335.
361.
See supra notes 216–220 and accompanying text.
362.
See Mirani, supra note 2.
363.
Id. The town itself is economically depressed—in fact, it was featured in a sixepisode sequence of a nationally broadcast television program called Dirty Old Towns, a
“makeover” reality show about small villages that have “let themselves go.” See DIRTY OLD
TOWNS: PORTARLINGTON (2012), http://www.rte.ie/tv/dirtyoldtowns/Portarlington.html.
364.
See Aoife Bannon, The Tiny Irish Office That Takes on Facebook, IRISH SUN
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.thesun.ie/irishsol/homepage/irishfeatures/6704950/The-tinyIrish-office-that-takes-on-Facebook.html.
365.
Former commissioner Hawkes commented on this. See Burrell, supra note 2
(“There has been some sneering about where we are located, but the ground floor just happens
to be occupied by a supermarket. It doesn’t really alter anything.”).
366.
2014 Annual Report, supra note 210, at 1.
367.
Press Release, Office Data Prot. Comm’r, Data Protection Commissioner
Welcomes
Budget
2017
Increase
in
Funding
(Oct.
13,
2016),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/13-10-2016-Data-Protection-Commissioner-welcomesBudget-2017-increase-in-funding/1601.htm.
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independence.368 At the same time, it created a new position of a Minister for Data
Protection within the Office of the Taoiseach (Ireland’s prime minister) and filled it
with a member of Ireland’s parliament who also has responsibilities as a Minister of
State for European Affairs. 369 Finally, the ODPC opened a second office in 2016—
this one located on a landmark square in central Dublin. 370
The enhanced budget and authority—and even the more dignified office
space—should help the ODPC go about its job. The Irish regulators will continue to
rely on their investigative and audit powers as central features of their responsive
regulation approach, but these are labor-intensive undertakings. For Dixon to follow
through on her stated plans to audit other large technology companies in a manner
similar to the Facebook review, those enhancements will be important. 371
It is more difficult to ascertain the resources devoted to privacy
enforcement by U.S. regulators, because those functions are subsumed in larger
agencies. According to documentation the FTC has submitted to Congress, it had 57
full-time staff positions related to its “Privacy and Identity Protection” function in
the 2015 fiscal year, and a budget for these functions of just under $10 million. 372
Those numbers are a bit higher than the ODPC—but for a nation with a population
some 80 times larger than Ireland’s.
This comparison could be somewhat misleading for several reasons, First,
the FTC is only one of multiple U.S. agencies enforcing privacy law. For a full
accounting, one would need to add all the resources devoted to privacy regulation
by state attorneys general and by numerous other federal agencies such as HHS, the
Department of Education, and the U.S. financial regulatory bodies. To take just one
368.
Press Release, Dep’t Taoiseach, “Budget 2015 Signals a New Era for Data
Protection
in
Ireland”
Murphy,
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Taoiseach_and_Government/About_the_Ministers_of_Stat
e/Minister_of_State_for_European_Affairs_Data_Protection_and_EU_Digital_Single_Mar
ket/MoS_Murphy_s_Press_Releases/%E2%80%9CBudget_2015_Signals_a_New_Era_for_
Data_Protection_in_Ireland%E2%80%9D_-_Murphy.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016)
(upgrading ODPC to a separate Office of the State).
369.
See Karin Lillington, Data Protection Must Be Front and Centre in
Information
Age,
IRISH
TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/data-protection-must-be-front-and-centrein-information-age-1.2091272 (discussing the appointment of Dara Murphy as the first
Minister for Data Protection, not only in Ireland, but in Europe).
370.
See Press Release, Dep’t Taoiseach, An Taoiseach and Minister Murphy
Announce New Dublin Premises for the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner,
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Taoiseach’s_Press_Releases/An_Taoiseach_and_Mi
nister_Murphy_announce_new_Dublin_premises_for_the_Office_of_the_Data_Protection_
Commissioner_.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). The Portarlington office will remain in
operation and technically continue as the headquarters. Id.; Contacting Us, DATA PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER, https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Contact-us/b/11.htm (last visited Oct.
23, 2016).
371.
See supra note 330.
372.
See FTC, FISCAL YEAR 2016 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 129–31
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2016-congressional-budgetjustification/2016-cbj.pdf.
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example, the division of HHS most directly responsible for enforcement of HIPAA
had a budget in Fiscal Year 2015 of just under $6.8 million, 373 which by itself
approaches the ODPC’s entire budget. In addition, remember that the ODPC must
oversee, not only every industry, but also the public sector. Finally, while the ODPC
is a free-standing entity, privacy regulators at larger agencies such as the FTC and
HHS can rely on other less specialized staff in their agencies (such as lawyers, office
technology, or meeting planning), so counting only the staff fully devoted to privacy
may understate the available support. Even with all that, it still seems unlikely that
the combined budgets of U.S. privacy regulators would add up to $640 million, as
would be necessary to have roughly the same spending per capita as Ireland will
have next year.
Setting aside the comparison, it is probable that funding for both U.S. and
Irish privacy regulators is too limited. Privacy regulators’ staff sizes differ widely,
but both the ODPC and the FTC are much smaller than several countries’ DPAs that
have over a hundred employees, including those in France, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.374
By the nature of government, regulators almost always operate under
resource constraints. Nevertheless, modest budgets and staffing surely force these
agencies to decline regulatory interventions that would be prudent. That does not
necessarily mean the extra money should be spent on adversarial enforcement. But
communication with regulated entities, development of educational materials and
guidance, and preliminary investigation all cost money, too. This is an area for
further improvement in both countries.
2. Penalties
As described earlier, the classic theory of responsive regulation requires a
“benign big gun” that remains behind the door, loaded, and well oiled.375 We have
established that the gun in regulatory friending is benign, but is it sufficiently loaded
and oiled? Do the penalties available at the top of the regulatory pyramid create
sufficient leverage when negotiations occur at lower levels of that pyramid?
Perhaps the most obvious penalty—and the one that critics of the
collaborative approach taken by the FTC and ODPC seem to expect376—would be a
monetary fine. Even had they wished to impose a fine on Facebook in the first
instance, neither the ODPC nor the FTC had the power to do so at the time.

373.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, FISCAL YEAR 2016
CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION
27–29
(Feb.
2,
2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/budget/office-of-civil-rights-budget-justification2016.pdf.
374.
See David Wright, Enforcing Privacy, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15
at 13, 29–30 (listing the number of employees working for various data protection authorities
around the world as of 2013).
375.
See supra notes 160–166 and accompanying text.
376.
See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
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Under the current Data Protection Act in Ireland, a financial penalty is
likely only in the rare prosecutions that reach court, and even there the maximum
sums are modest, typically just a few thousand euros.377 The GDPR will usher in a
dramatically different penalty structure, which will automatically take effect in
Ireland in 2018. Its graduated administrative fines are complicated, but in the most
serious cases could amount to 4% of a company’s global annual turnover—that is,
revenue. 378 In preparation for its initial public offering, Facebook reported gross
revenue in 2011 of $3.7 billion. 379 Thus, if the ODPC had been able to conduct its
2011 Facebook investigation under the new 2018 rules, it theoretically could have
fined the company up to $148 million if it uncovered very serious privacy flaws.
Certainly, a fine of this magnitude would be a potent regulatory weapon.
In fact, the maximum fine is so large that a threat to impose it might not be terribly
credible.380 Under the graduated penalty structure, the ODPC would also have the
option of charging an amount that is considerably lower than 4% of revenue, but
still significant.
The FTC cannot fine an entity either, at least not when relying solely on its
powers under Section 5. As noted previously, the FTC can parlay a consent decree
entered for a first offense into fines for subsequent infractions, as it did against
Google.381 The FTC also enjoys the authority to fine companies for violations of
other statutes such as COPPA, and it has exercised this power frequently to extract
civil penalties in settlements.382 A few U.S. regulators can impose very large fines.
The California Attorney General recently settled a consumer-protection suit with
Comcast, which had carelessly published telephone numbers of customers who had
paid to have unlisted numbers.383 The price tag was a $25 million civil penalty plus
nearly $8 million in restitution. 384 In the foreseeable future, however, the FTC will
not have traditional fining authority in the bulk of its consumer protection
jurisdiction, except over companies already covered by consent decrees.

377.
See supra note 228–235 and accompanying text.
378.
See GDPR, supra note 13, at art. 83.
379.
See Tomio Geron, Facebook’s $5 Billion IPO Filing: $3.7 Billion in 2011
Revenue, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/02/01/facebooks5-billion-ipo-filing-3-7-billion-in-2011-revenue/.
380.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
381.
See supra notes 259–64 and accompanying text.
382.
See, e.g., United States v. Yelp, Inc., Case No. 3:14-CV-04163 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2014) (order) ($450,000 penalty); United States v. Artist Arena, LLC, Case No. 112CV-07386 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012) (Order) (one-million-dollar penalty). That said, the FTC
also uses responsive regulation under COPPA. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 206–07
(describing use of safe harbor programs, an enforcement approach under COPPA that adheres
to the responsive regulation model).
383.
See California v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, No. 15786197 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) in MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 248.
384.
Id. at 254–55. Based on the Attorney General’s allegations about the number
of violations and the maximum possible statutory penalty. In the event of a fully favorable
verdict, Comcast might have been liable for over $262 million. See MCGEVERAN, supra note
23, at 255.
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The FTC does have some powers fairly high up the pyramid that can help
cajole companies into compliance. Even the initiation of an FTC investigation is
viewed by many regulated entities as a serious problem. The imposition of ongoing
oversight in consent decrees is even more significant. One U.S. corporate privacy
official interviewed by Bamberger and Mulligan went so far as to call the possibility
of operating under a decree a “Three-Mile Island scenario” that motivated top
executives in the firm to take privacy and security issues seriously. 385 So, while the
FTC’s regulatory pyramid may not rise to quite as high a peak as those of some other
American regulators, and certainly not to where E.U. regulators will reach under the
GDPR, the FTC’s top-of-the-pyramid penalties still manage to alarm and motivate
corporate privacy managers and their bosses.
That said, the FTC would probably be able to act more effectively, even as
a friendly regulator, if it had the power to levy fines under Section 5. A regulator
does not need to impose its most severe punishments often, or perhaps at all, to
influence all other cases. 386 The risk of being subjected to an investigation or a
consent decree for poor data-handling practices, while meaningful, is presumably
not as potent a disincentive as a direct financial penalty. If the agency retained the
money raised by fines, it could also use them to provide some of the necessary
resources identified in Section III.A.1, above.
3. Accountability
Behind much of the criticism of friendly privacy regulation is a suspicion,
stated or implied, that regulators might be captured by companies. In order to
maintain accountability, responsive regulation must be responsive not only to
companies, but also to the public, advocacy groups, the media, and legislators.
In Ireland, several formal mechanisms foster that accountability and help
prevent the ODPC from entering an overly cozy friendship with regulated entities.
First, as mentioned previously, the ODPC acts on every complaint it receives. 387
Admittedly, a fully captured agency could give short shrift to many complaints. But
a formal complaint mechanism still provides an opportunity for ordinary citizens to
disrupt any capture dynamic. The ODPC’s annual reporting of statistics about the
disposition of complaints further enhances this accountability function. 388 Besides,
capture is possible no matter what punishments agencies can or do impose—
transparent procedures and strong ethics rules are more effective prophylactics
against capture, regardless of the regulatory approach adopted. 389
Not only does the complaint procedure itself enhance accountability, but
people dissatisfied with the ODPC’s initial response can challenge it in court. This
is exactly what Schrems did in his Safe Harbor case objecting to the ODPC’s
385.
386.

Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 16, at 274.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 36–37; GUNNINGHAM &
GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 396–97, 396 nn.50–51.
387.
See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
388.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
389.
See generally DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, EDS., PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (2013).
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dispositions of some of his complaints against Facebook. 390 The Data Protection Act
instructs the ODPC to issue formal decisions even when it elects to take no further
action. 391 While the Irish courts adhere to a doctrine of “curial deference” with
regard to administrative agencies, they do serve as a check against actions that are
arbitrary, unduly credulous toward industry, or contrary to the judicial
understanding of the law, as demonstrated, again, by the Schrems Safe Harbor
litigation. 392 Serious challenges may then be referred from Irish courts to E.U.
courts, as happened in Schrems. 393 Possible intervention by E.U. courts helps
prevent a “race to the bottom” on data protection by Irish institutions, whether
regulatory or judicial.394 Too great a departure from established E.U. data protection
norms can and will be overturned.
Nor is judicial review the only external check on the ODPC’s enforcement
choices.395 Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive established an advisory body
composed of representatives from each nation’s data protection regulatory agency
and from the European Commission. 396 The so-called “Article 29 Working Party”
issues detailed opinions interpreting the requirements of E.U. data protection law.397
While these determinations are only advisory, they are highly influential. National
and E.U. courts cite them as persuasive authority and there is strong institutional

390.
See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 62014CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015).
391.
See Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 11(a)(2).
392.
See Patrick O’Reilly, The Doctrine of Curial Deference in Ireland, 7 JUD.
STUDS.
INST.
J.
197,
197
(2007),
http://www.jsijournal.ie/html/Volume%207%20No.%202/2007%5B2%5D_O’Reilly_Curial
%20Deference%20in%20Ireland.pdf (describing curial defense as judicial restraint when
reviewing decisions of independent regulatory “expert” bodies).
393.
The ODPC can also seek rulings from the Court of Justice directly, and the
ODPC recently did so in response to yet another Schrems complaint, challenging the validity
of model contract clauses to permit cross-border data transfers in the wake of the earlier Safe
Harbor decision. See Alexander J. Martin, Irish Data Cops Kick Max Schrems’ Latest
Facebook Complaint Up to EU Court, REGISTER (May 25, 2016),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/05/25/ireland_data_protection_commissioner_asks_eu_d
ecision_max_schrems_complaint/.
394.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (1987) (discussing the importance of checks and balances in regulatory authorities);
cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
395.
See Francesca Bignami, Mixed Administration in the European Data
Protection Directive: The Regulation of International Data Transfers 1 RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 31 (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232325 (analyzing
“mixed administration” between national and E.U.-level authorities in the enforcement of the
Directive’s limits on cross-border data transfers).
396.
E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, art. 29.
397.
See Article 29 Working Party, EUR. COMMISSION: JUSTICE,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2016).
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pressure for national regulators not to stray too far from the consensus of their
peers.398
The GDPR will introduce additional restraints. The ODPC would continue
to function as the “lead supervisory authority” with jurisdiction over companies that
have their “main establishment” in Ireland. 399 Consequently, the ODPC will
maintain significant influence over data protection enforcement against Facebook,
Google, Apple, and all the other technology giants who have their largest European
presence on Irish soil. This lead supervisory authority is not, however, exclusive
power, as was envisioned in some earlier proposals for a “one stop shop” regulatory
structure in the EU.400 Rather, the GDPR sets up a consultation process for a primary
regulator like the ODPC to confer with data protection regulators in other countries
where people were affected by a challenged data-handling practice. 401 A newly
created European Data Protection Board will resolve disagreements between
national regulators about the regulatory approach taken. 402
It remains to be seen, in 2018 and beyond, exactly how the E.U. will
structure this new Board and the consultation process. These conformity
mechanisms must try to balance the sovereign interests of E.U. member states with
the Union’s objective of harmonizing law across the integrated European market.403
The prospects for responsive regulation within that structure will be an important
area for future study. If E.U. member states meddle with one another, national
regulators like the ODPC could find themselves hindered from using more
collaborative techniques. If handled with respect for national choices of regulatory
style, however, these additional accountability mechanisms may simply provide
further assurance that friendly regulation does not become crony regulation.
The FTC is not subject to many formal mechanisms of this nature. The
Commission is not required to act on complaints, and citizens cannot challenge
regulatory inaction in court, or elsewhere. Public comments on consent decrees
seldom have any impact.404 Greater institutional accountability might be desirable

398.
See CAREY, supra note 56, at 56 (describing the influence of the Article 29
Working Party on Irish data protection law); KUNER, supra note 22, at 9–10
(“Pronouncements of the Working Party can have significant impact on the decisions of
national courts and DPAs.”).
399.
See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 4, §16 (defining a company’s “main
establishment” as “the place of its central administration in the [European] Union”); id. art.
56 (designating the regulator in a company’s “main establishment” as the “lead supervisory
authority” with primary jurisdiction over the company’s compliance with data protection
law).
400.
See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data (COM 2012) 11, 32 ¶97.
401.
GDPR, supra note 13, arts. 60–62.
402.
Id. arts. 60, 63–66, 68 (creating the Board and specifying resolution and
consistency mechanisms for disagreements between national DPAs).
403.
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
404.
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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to reduce the risk of capture, empower individuals, and increase public acceptance
of the FTC’s regulatory choices.
One accountability mechanism that is stronger in the United States than in
Ireland is a comparatively robust privacy advocacy community. 405
Nongovernmental organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, 406 the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 407 the Center for Democracy and
Technology, 408 and many others serve as watchdogs and gadflies to prevent
inappropriate behavior by regulatory agencies. When these organizations call on
regulators to act, they can also mobilize press coverage, questions from sympathetic
members of Congress, and grassroots pressure from their members.409
Privacy advocacy in Ireland is more limited. Digital Rights Ireland 410 has
made considerable inroads, including a successful E.U. court case to overturn a data
retention directive that it argued compromised citizen privacy in relation to law
enforcement. 411 Groups from other E.U. countries (including Schrems’s
organization) also intercede in Ireland.412 Even so, scrutiny of the ODPC by NGOs
and media may be somewhat less intense than what the FTC receives. It might also
be less important in light of the formal accountability mechanisms in Irish and E.U.
law that are missing in the United States. Perhaps such groups in both countries
could be further strengthened by means that Ayres and Braithwaite call “tripartism,”
where external watchdogs have access to information held by regulators, increasing
their power to prevent capture or collusion between government and industry. 413
B. Further Study
Privacy scholars have begun to pay more attention to the actual practices
of privacy regulation “on the ground.” Yet the map of that space is far from

405.
See COLIN J. BENNETT, THE PRIVACY ADVOCATES (2010) (discussing the role
of independent advocates to spur government action against problematic data practices).
406.
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., www.epic.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
407.
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, www.eff.org (last visited Sept. 21,
2016).
408.
CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH., www.cdt.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
409.
See BENNETT, supra note 405, at 328; see also GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY,
supra note 134, at 94–106 (making similar points about environmental public interest groups).
410.
DIGITAL RIGHTS IRELAND, https://www.digitalrights.ie/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2016).
411.
See Case 293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns,
Marine
&
Nat.
Res.
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN.
412.
See, e.g., EDRI, https://edri.org/about (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing
the structure of pan-EU coalition of digital privacy advocacy groups).
413.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 54–100.
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complete. 414 Research such as Bennett’s groundbreaking work; 415 Bignami’s
empirical study of data protection regulatory styles in four European countries;416 or
Bamberger and Mulligan’s comprehensive examination of corporate behavior 417
blazed the trail toward the study of real practices rather than just formal law. Recent
scholarly examinations of the institutional role of particular regulatory agencies in
the overall enforcement scheme add important details to the map.418
This Article has added an analysis of responsive regulation as an effective
privacy enforcement tool, and a focus on the especially important practices of
Ireland’s DPA. But there is much more to be done to expand the examination here
across several dimensions. One important path to continue exploring is
methodological. Observation and interviews with regulatory officials would
contribute greatly to understanding the motivations and rationales for the choices
they make.419 This form of observational case study is very well established in the
responsive regulation literature outside of the privacy context.420
Another fruitful trail would be an extension of the inquiry to other
regulatory agencies and other statutes. Why does the ODPC make different choices
of regulatory approaches than some other European regulators, and how do the
results of these different approaches compare? Among U.S. regulators, this Article
has focused on the FTC exercising its Section 5 authority. Sectoral U.S. privacy
regulators such as HHS and the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights
broadly emulate the responsive approach taken by the FTC. And the FTC itself
embraces responsive regulation techniques under COPPA, which is a data protection
statute. Likewise, Jane Winn has described the Red Flags Rule, developed jointly
by the FTC and financial regulatory agencies to reduce financial identity theft risk,
as an example of new governance techniques. 421

414.
Cf. Donald Clarke, ‘Nothing But Wind?’ The Past and Future of Comparative
Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 94 (2010) (similarly arguing that comparative
corporate governance scholarship “would benefit from a stronger focus on the institutional
environment for corporate governance. This means comparing not just rules, no matter how
well selected, but also the various institutions that exist to make the rules meaningful.”).
415.
See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18; BENNETT, supra note 405; BENNETT,
supra note 18.
416.
See Bignami, supra note 15
417.
See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16; Bamberger & Mulligan, supra
note 16.
418.
See, e.g., HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15; Citron, supra note 15; Solove &
Hartzog, supra note 15.
419.
For examples of work about privacy regulation employing interview-based
methodology, see BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16; BENNETT & RAAB, supra note
18; Hirsch, supra note 15.
420.
The works collected in REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS, supra note 6, provide
numerous examples. See also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 17–19 (describing interviewbased study of Australian nursing home regulation); Schwarcz, supra note 155, at 735 n.*
(describing extensive use of interviews in detailed examination of United Kingdom’s
Financial Ombudsman Service and insurance regulators in several U.S. states).
421.
Jane K. Winn, Are ‘Better’ Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1163–64 (2009).

2016]

PRIVACY REGULATORS

1025

Finally, it is not certain that responsive regulation is equally effective in all
aspects of data privacy enforcement: do lessons shaped by the social media case
study in this Article extend fully to areas such as regulation of data breaches or deidentification of personal information?
These questions help to shape a research agenda for this author and other
scholars that will both critique existing regulatory models and contribute to their
improvement.

CONCLUSION
Adversarial combat is not the only effective mode of regulation. New
governance scholars have explained the benefits of models like responsive
regulation. Techniques of collaboration, flexibility, and the carefully graduated
penalties of the regulatory pyramid work well for enforcement of privacy and data
protection law. They help regulators to encourage companies to improve their
practices continually, retain the flexibility to deal with changing technology, and
discharge their oversight duties cost-effectively—while maintaining the well-oiled
“shotgun behind the door” as an incentive for companies to comply.
In addition, when regulators under different legal regimes share this
cooperative regulatory approach, it bridges gaps between them and can enable
companies to develop common global strategies based on best practices that comply
with legal requirements in disparate jurisdictions. This makes the theoretically sharp
differences between countries less significant in practice.
There is room for improvement of responsive privacy regulation, and many
topics require further exploration. Nevertheless, the case study examined here—the
regulatory styles used in the U.S. and Ireland, particularly with regard to their
parallel investigations of Facebook—suggest that “regulatory friending” works
effectively in the privacy context. Collaboration gives companies more clarity about
their compliance obligations and minimizes their risk of being surprised by an
adversarial regulatory action. Meanwhile, regulators can improve real-world data
practices efficiently, flexibly, and cooperatively.

